AUKUS: A Strategic Necessity, Not a Risky Gamble

 AUKUS: A Strategic Necessity, Not a Risky Gamble

The AUKUS security partnership has sparked widespread debate in Australia, with critics voicing concerns over sovereignty, cost, strategic risks, and feasibility. Figures such as Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Hugh White, Bob Carr, and Elbridge Colby have argued that the agreement ties Australia too closely to the United States and the United Kingdom, making the country overly dependent on U.S. defense priorities. The recent $500 million USD payment to support the U.S. submarine industrial base has further intensified these debates. However, despite these criticisms, AUKUS remains the best strategic option for Australia’s long-term security and technological advancement.

1. The Key Criticisms of AUKUS

A. Sovereignty Concerns: A Loss of Australian Control?

Critics argue that AUKUS compromises Australia’s military independence, with some warning that the country could be subordinate to U.S. strategic decisions. Malcolm Turnbull has been particularly vocal, stating that AUKUS makes Australia “an extension of U.S. naval forces” (News.com.au). Bob Carr has similarly called AUKUS a “colossal surrender of sovereignty” (The Guardian).

Response: While sovereignty concerns are valid, AUKUS enhances Australia’s ability to defend itself independently by enabling it to develop a domestic nuclear-powered submarine capability. Unlike the French Attack-class submarines, which would have required reliance on French contractors for maintenance, AUKUS involves a long-term domestic shipbuilding program in Adelaide, ensuring greater control over national defense assets.

B. Financial Costs: Is AUKUS Too Expensive?

The projected $368 billion AUD cost over 30+ years has drawn scrutiny, with critics arguing that Australia is paying large sums upfront without an immediate return. Turnbull criticized the agreement, stating: “We are spending $3 billion to support the US submarine industrial base, but we have no guarantee we will ever get any submarines” (AFR).

Response: Major defense projects require long-term investment, and AUKUS is no different. However, the partnership provides access to cutting-edge technology beyond submarines, including AI, cyber capabilities, and missile technology, ensuring a future-proofed defense capability. Moreover, the SSN-AUKUS submarine development program ensures Australia will eventually build and sustain its own fleet, reducing long-term reliance on external suppliers.

C. Strategic Risk: U.S. Political Uncertainty and Delivery Risks

Elbridge Colby and other analysts have warned that the U.S. may struggle to meet its own submarine-building targets, leading to potential delays for Australia (The Guardian). Future U.S. administrations could also deprioritize the agreement, leaving Australia vulnerable.

Response: While political shifts in the U.S. are a legitimate concern, AUKUS mitigates these risks by adopting a phased approach:

  1. Short-Term: Acquiring Virginia-class submarines from the U.S. to bridge capability gaps in the 2030s.

  2. Long-Term: Co-developing and producing SSN-AUKUS submarines in Australia with the UK, ensuring domestic submarine capability independent of shifting U.S. policies.

2. Why AUKUS is the Best Option for Australia

A. AUKUS is More Flexible Than the Former French Deal

Unlike the rigid, commercially driven contract Australia had with France’s Naval Group, AUKUS is a strategic partnership that allows for adaptability and expansion beyond submarines. The French contract:

  • Required extensive modifications to a conventional design, adding cost and delays.

  • Left Australia dependent on French contractors for maintenance and refits.

  • Offered no additional technological benefits beyond submarines.

AUKUS, by contrast, offers greater long-term security and flexibility, allowing Australia to integrate:

  • Advanced undersea warfare capabilities.

  • Nuclear-powered submarines with extended range and stealth.

  • Collaboration on AI, quantum computing, and missile technology.

B. AUKUS Strengthens Regional Deterrence

Paul Keating and other critics argue that AUKUS unnecessarily provokes China and ties Australia to U.S. war planning (The Guardian). However, China has been rapidly expanding its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, conducting naval exercises near Australia and deepening security ties with Pacific Island nations.

AUKUS ensures Australia can respond to emerging threats without relying solely on U.S. intervention. By establishing a capable and sovereign Australian fleet, AUKUS strengthens regional deterrence, ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific.

3. Conclusion: Staying the Course with AUKUS

While critics raise valid concerns about sovereignty, cost, and feasibility, these concerns do not justify abandoning AUKUS or returning to the outdated French submarine deal. AUKUS offers long-term strategic advantages, including a sovereign nuclear-powered submarine fleet, access to advanced military technology, and a flexible defense framework that strengthens Australia’s security posture.

Rather than a reckless gamble, AUKUS is a calculated investment in Australia’s defense future. By staying committed to AUKUS, Australia secures a stronger, more independent role in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring its security for decades to come.

 

Dr Hugh Tuckfield

Hugh Tuckfield is a political theorist and human rights lawyer with a career that spans academia, law, and international consultancy. Hugh's academic journey began at Monash University, where he earned degrees in Economics and Law. He further expanded his knowledge with a Master of Human Rights and Democratization (Asia-Pacific Region) from the University of Sydney and the Kathmandu School of Law. His commitment to research led him to complete his doctoral thesis at the University of Sydney in the Department of Government and International Relations. He has held positions as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, a WZB Sydney University Merit Fellow at the WZB Social Science Center in Berlin, and an associate of the Sydney Asia Pacific Migration Center. These roles have allowed him to engage in innovative research and collaboration with fellow scholars. , Hugh has lectured at the University of Sydney and the Kathmandu School of Law on subjects such as international human rights, research methods, and the regional and global governance of migration. His teaching reflects his passion for knowledge-sharing and mentorship.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/hughtuckfield/
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