Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met with the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Mr. Pham Minh Chinh, as he visited Canberra after attending the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in Melbourne last week. Together, they announced a comprehensive strategic partnership, elevating ties between Vietnam and Australia to a new level.

• What are the specific areas of cooperation?

• How will the comprehensive strategic partnership contribute to regional peace, stability, and prosperity?

• How do minilateral arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region complement multilateral frameworks?

• Will growing minilateralism strengthen or weaken the regional security architecture of the Indo-Pacific?

What specific areas of cooperation are highlighted in the partnership between Vietnam and Australia?

Vietnam and Australia have strengthened their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, focusing on cooperation in political, defense, security, economic, and various other areas. They express concerns about the situation in the South China Sea and emphasize their commitment to peace, security, and stability in the region.

The partnership between Vietnam and Australia highlights several specific areas of cooperation, including:

1. Human Resource Development and Education: Commitment to support Vietnam's human resource development and increase education and training cooperation through dialogues, cooperation mechanisms, and institutional linkages. This includes enabling Australian universities to open foreign branch campuses in Vietnam and supporting skills formation and vocational education and training systems in collaboration with the private sector.

2. Travel and Tourism: Efforts to support increased travel and tourism between the two countries, including strengthening the two-way flow of young people through the reciprocal work and holiday visa arrangement and continuing the flow of students between both nations.

3. Political, Defense, Security, and Justice Cooperation: Renewed commitment to high-level engagement across various channels, including defense, security, and justice ties, which contribute to regional peace and stability. This includes expanding education and training programs, elevating peacekeeping cooperation, and enhancing law enforcement and intelligence cooperation.

4. Economic Relations and Trade: Cooperation to promote a transparent business and regulatory environment, support investment, and advance a strong rules-based multilateral trading system. Commitment to fully implementing agreements such as the ASEAN Australia New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP).

5. Digital Transition and Inclusion: Deepening cooperation on digital transition and inclusion through a Digital Economy Memorandum of Understanding, which will identify priority areas for digital trade cooperation. This includes sharing experiences to enhance digital government transformation.

6. Regional and International Cooperation: Working closely to support institutions that underpin a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, promoting common political, economic, and security interests, and addressing regional and global issues of concern. This includes supporting ASEAN centrality and unity.

These areas of cooperation aim to enhance bilateral ties and contribute to regional stability and prosperity.

How will the comprehensive strategic partnership contribute to regional peace, stability, and prosperity?

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Vietnam and Australia aims to contribute to regional peace, stability, and prosperity by reinforcing cooperation in areas including respect for international law, upholding sovereignty, and addressing common challenges.

The partnership also focuses on deepening political, defense, security, and justice cooperation, which contributes to peace, stability, and regional development.

Additionally, the partnership emphasizes enhancing economic engagement, strengthening climate, environment, and energy cooperation, and supporting science, technology, and innovation, all of which are crucial for regional peace, stability, and prosperity. 

However, it's important to note that while the partnership addresses various aspects of cooperation, there may still be challenges and issues in the region that are beyond the scope of this partnership.

These include unresolved territorial disputes, complex geopolitical dynamics, and other regional security concerns that have not been fully addressed through this bilateral partnership alone.

How do minilateral arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region complement multilateral frameworks?

Minilateral arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region can serve as valuable complements to multilateral frameworks. These arrangements facilitate more effective cooperation among groups of actors already engaged in larger, multilateral settings, allowing them to work together with greater flexibility and responsiveness, unencumbered by institutional constraints.

They can be “positively selective," enabling more focused and efficient collaboration among countries with common objectives. This, in turn, alleviates the burden on institutional formats that may struggle with limited initiative capacities and coordination challenges inherent in larger groups.

However, will the growing minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific further heighten tensions with China, especially when minlateralism is seen in the context of rivalry between the US and China, and between the small and middle powers of the Indo-Pacific and China?

Will growing minilateralism strengthen or weaken the regional security architecture of the Indo-Pacific?

Some have argued that there is agenda saturation—an overwhelming accumulation of commitments, meetings, and cooperative mechanisms, leading to an overload that can dilute the effectiveness and focus of diplomatic and strategic efforts.

This phenomenon is particularly noted in the context of the Indo-Pacific region, where the proliferation of multilateral and minilateral arrangements, strategies, and dialogues has resulted in a superimposition of structures and an excessive number of initiatives. It’s argued that this not only strains the operational capacities of the actors involved but also indirectly weakens the promotion and coordinated pursuit of global security objectives in the region.

However, I strongly argue that the so-called “agenda saturation” is responding to strategic urgencies in the Indo-Pacific. The void left by a failing or, at least, a stumbling multilateralism. is being filled by minilateralism. It is an approach offering more focused cooperation among smaller groups of countries. It is diplomacy on steroids. It's better to talk, talk, and talk some  more than the vastly destructive alternative of military conflicts.

It is evident that multilateralism in the form of ASEAN is failing in its call to coordinate the organisation’s members on key issues, such as relations with China in the context of the territorial tensions in the South China Sea.

Do ASEAN member states, threatened by China, both overtly and coercively, have no alternative to protect their very existence?

For member states coerced by the great power of China and, in some instances, Russia, minilateralism is an obvious alternative. 

Australia’s comprehensive strategic partnership with Vietnam follows hot on the heels of the recent MOUs signed between Australia and the Philippines in defense, maritime, and cybersecurity fields, which highlight a significant escalation in collaboration.

We should expect more such partnerships to strengthen the latticework of regional security in the Indo-Pacific.