Sino-American Relations in Historical Perspective: Competing Worldviews and Global Security Implications
Abstract:
The Sino-American relations have become the major geopolitical challenge of this century. The steady erosion in Sino-American relations over the last few years coupled with black swan event like Covid19 outbreak and the ongoing war in Ukraine have posed severe systemic threats to the Liberal World Order led by the US. The relations further deteriorated following 2022 Nancy Pelosi visit to Taiwan, one of the major flash points in Sino-American relations, and China’s exaggerated reaction leading to live military drills around the Island, projecting its capability to blockade the Island and keep the world at ransom. China also halted cooperation with the US on range of critical issues including climate talks and military dialogues, which further diming the prospects of Sino-American relations in near future and threatens the global security.
China and the US are now long-term Strategic Competitor and Systemic Rivals with starkly different vision for the future of the world. China wants to promote an alternate world order sans the US at centre and the US is determined to maintain its dominance. This strategic competition and rivalry have come to the forefront of global debate, strategy, and policy.
Set in this context, the present paper seeks to explore following questions: What are the different worldviews propagated and promoted by the US and China and its possible implications for the rest of the world? Could either of them, the US or China, be the sole global hegemon? What are the prospects of Sino-American relations given the current situation, more confrontation rather cooperation? This paper tries to dive into the core irritant of the Sino-American in a historical context and try to analyse its implications on the present Sino-American relations.
About the Author
Dr. Mansi is currently working as Assistant Professor and Coordinator, Amity Centre for BRICS Study at Amity University Haryana. She also serves as the Deputy Director of Indo-Pacific Studies Center. She is Indo-Pacific Fellow at Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, and Honorary Research Associate at Indo-Pacific Research Centre, Murdoch University. She is MOFA Taiwan fellow (2023) and 2022 MOE (Taiwan) fellow.
I. Background
Sino-American relations are at its lowest ebb for few years now. The downward spiral which started during cowboy-highly-unpredictable President Trump has seen its way to the current administration under President Biden. Now under Trump 2.O, the bilateral relations are expected to take a further plunge as the POTUS, surrounded by China hawks, intends to be hard on China and the next four years will be consequential. The first Trump administration represented a critical juncture in the evolution of U.S.-China relations (Burak Elmalı 2025). The bilateral dynamics witnessed considerable shifts which was marked by an escalation of trade disputes. The unilateral tariff increases by the US and the corresponding retaliatory measures by China severely undermined the Most Favoured Nation and Permanent Normal Trade Relations framework which had been established following China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. This dynamic that has since evolved into a bipartisan consensus under the Biden administration which continued an assertive stance on China.
The new Trump presidency, in less than two weeks in the office, has already imposed extra 10 percent tariff across all Chinese imports, to which China promptly responded slapping tariffs on the US imports, thus the trade war between two most powerful economies of the world begins unfolding, with potential implication for the world.
The Sino American relations have become the most important and contentious issue in the world affairs of this century that has the potential to affect and effect the whole world. The strategic community and policy makers across the various capitals are cautiously watching as the number one and number two world economy are seeing eye to eye, who blinks first is difficult to predict.
Xi Jinping unprecedented third term, which many label as his coronation, has further consolidation his power. Under his leadership, China has already become more authoritarian at home and coercive abroad. In his opening speech he said China’s “great rejuvenation” is now an “irreversible historical process” and the party had already created a “new choice” for humanity with its unique path to modernization, a nod to China’s emergence as an alternative to Western democracies led by the United States (US). Xi’s nationalist vision of a “Chinese dream” to reclaim the nation’s place at the center of global affairs is one of his core missions. This stood in stark contrast to the core mission of Biden administration (2021-24) which promoted normative values like safeguarding democracy, human right and maintaining liberal international world order to which China is the “most serious long-term challenge”. The tone has already been set for few years now. What follows in the wake of increased power concentration in Xi and the US resolve to counter China as systemic rival is a matter of global concern.
The US- China relations have long been characterised by powerful elements of convergence and divergence; however, the contemporary relations manifest more elements of unprecedented divergences with heightened flashpoints. The external factors have played important role in shaping up their relations, like Japanese aggression during first half of 20th century or Soviet threat in the later part brought the two countries together. However, the divergences seem emanating mainly from the internal factors like human rights issue in China, monetary policy, authoritarianism et al, which reflects fundamental elements of their respective worldviews. These divergences are causative factor in ongoing Sino-American conflict. The world at present is in a geopolitical flux and uncertainties due to the unprecedented events unfolding globally since last few years, like the Covid19 outbreak, the American forces pulling out of Afghanistan (2021), the ongoing war in Ukraine due to Russian invasion (2022). These events paint a grim picture for global security as the world grapples with challenges to democracy, sovereignty, territorial integrity, health security, to name a few.
The phenomenal rise of China and its global economic predominance coupled with rising political and military power clashes with a world order led by the United States, where despite facing many challenges, the US still exerts broad leadership which reflects its superpower status. The US-China bilateral relations are becoming more and more characterized by competition than cooperation. The US labelled China as “strategic competitor” in 2018. The nature of competition with China has become more of a rivalry and the two countries can be said a “near-peer rival” whose interests and values diverge sharply (Weiss 2022).
Indeed, there are valid reasons for American strategic community and policy makers to be concerned about a more powerful and assertive China. Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has become more authoritarian domestically as evident from violent suppression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and crushing of democratic freedom in Hong Kong. Internationally, Beijing has become more coercive and aggressive. It has aggressively intercepted foreign military aircraft in the East and South China Sea and has swiftly increased its conventional and nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, on Russian invasion of Ukraine, far from condemning Putin, China blames the US and the West for Russia’s action. Furthermore, China “amplified Russian disinformation, exported censorship and surveillance technology, denigrated democracies, worked to reshape international norms” (Weiss 2022). The US on its part is not leaving any stone unturned to counter China, like forging alliances in Indo-Pacific, urging a coalition of democratic countries and like-minded partners to counter China, and sanctioning Chinese firms and personnel.
China is now viewed as a systemic rival which seeks to promote an alternate world order where China will be at the centre. Liberal internationalism, the dominant worldview led by the US which forms the basis of liberal democratic world worder since the end of WWII seems under shadow of the emergence of authoritarian and autocratic China as major power. The current rule based liberal world order with the principle of economic and political liberalism, commitment to open market economy and free market democracies has been under the patronage of the American hegemony. These concepts have been well codified in the liberal global institutions established by the US which remains at its centre. End of cold war left America as sole superpower and guarantor of current world order, temporarily unchallenged though.
However, China’s ‘opening up’ since 1978, and its subsequent unprecedented path of capitalist growth and expansion to its current position as the second largest economy in the world with the second largest military, have sparked concerns in the US strategic community and much academic and public debate on whether a rising China will seek to change the rules of the liberal world order and challenge the United States as the hegemon within it.
With the present chain of event, the world clearly seems to be divided into two geopolitical hemispheres, a rule based, liberal democratic order advocated by the US, and an authoritarian bloc led by China. A China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis also seem plausible. The future of world will increasingly be influenced by the re-emergence of China as a major power on the world stage, and by the way in which the United States reacts to China’s growing influence.
Based on the above-mentioned background, the present paper argues that the prospect of Sino-American relations depends on how they accommodate and engage with each other. The conflicts, disagreements and divergences in the relations are the reflection of their respective worldviews which clashes at the fundamental level of their existence. However, there are plenty of points of convergence like health and environment, technology, economic and energy security, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism, where the two countries should forge meaningful alliance and take leadership position for greater global good.
II. Evolution of Sino-American relations: Troubled Past Uncertain Future
The following section shows that on balance the historical trajectory has not been positive, with tensions reaching a high point of conflict and confrontation during the first two decades of the Cold War. The breakthrough took place under the leadership of President Richard Nixon (1969–74) and Chairman Mao Zedong in 1970s. Last four decades of Sino American bilateral relations are based on engagement policies initiated by these two leaders which opened a door for rapprochement. This rapprochement led to normalization in the relations under Deng Xiaoping and President Carter. PRC got the full diplomatic recognition and formal ties with Taiwan were severed. The bilateral relations were solidified mainly in three areas, “support to the strategic rise of China to counter the then Soviet Union, stability in bilateral relations and an understanding on Taiwan issue” (Sargent 2014). The three joint communiques of 1972, 1978, and 1982 form the basis of the US-China relations.
Both have in the four decades expanded economic and trade relations to become large trading partners. China is currently the largest goods trading partner of the US with $559.2 billion in total (two way) goods trade during 2020 despite COVID19 disruption. Goods exports totaled $124.5 billion; goods imports totaled $434.7 billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with China was $310.3 billion in 2020. This is a spectacular rise since 1979 when the bilateral trade was a mere 2.37 billion USD. However, trade deficit since the 1990s has also soared and is currently in favor of China which has led to sharp criticism from the US in the last few years encouraging the Trump administration to announce sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports, worth at least $50 billion in March 2018. This initiated the trade war between the two countries. The White House also accuses China of technology and intellectual property theft, currency manipulation, forced technology transfer et al.
Despite the divergences in interests, the US-China relations have also been marked by number of converge areas as reflected in their engagement policies adopted since the 1970s. Mutual understanding on several issues such as environment, counterterrorism, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, coordination on regional security issues such as Afghanistan initially and then on North Korea, Iran, and others. However, the failure of the January 2020 agreement on tariffs has spilled over into many other issues. Later that year, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivers a speech titled “Communist China and the Free World’s Future”. He declares that the era of engagement with the Chinese Communist Party is over. He condemned its unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft, human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and aggressive moves in the East and South China Seas. He calls on Chinese citizens and democracies worldwide to press Beijing to change its behavior and respect the rules-based international order. This signalled a profound shift in the US policy vis-à-vis China.
Biden administration continues some Trump administration policies, although it places more emphasis on coordinating its actions with allies. However, the tariffs on Chinese imports, sanctions on Chinese officials over policies in Hong Kong and Xinjiang have been maintained. This coupled with blacklisting dozens of Chinese companies and a Trump-era ban on American investment in Chinese firms with ties to the military are continuing without any further sign of change in the policy. In his first speech to Congress, in April 2021, President Biden stressed the importance of boosting investment in U.S. infrastructure and technology to compete with China as China is now views as ‘strategic competitor’. Further coordinating with its allies, the US administration seems to be pushing its allies to collectively respond to China. The NATO declaration of June 2021 says, “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to alliance security”. This is the first time NATO communiqué referred to threats from China at the US urging.
The two major events of 2022, Russian invasion of Ukraine in February and Nancy Pelosi visit to Taiwan in August, have further deteriorated the Sino American relations with a potential to have profound implication on the global security. There is major clash between the two countries policy and position vis-a-via Russia, while China refused to condemn Russia, the US lays out sanctions and other coordinated efforts with allies to punish Russia. In a video call with Xi President Biden warned China of “implications and consequences” if Beijing decides to give material aid to Russia to support its war in Ukraine. Xi criticizes the sanctions, saying they “would only make people suffer,” however both leaders express support for peace talks.
On another front, the short trip by Nancy Pelosi, the second most senior American politician, to Taiwan brought the already troubled Sino-American relations on the verge of collapse. It also sent the ripples across the world. The possibility of invading Taiwan for eventual reunification with mainland China seemed, what many regarded as a remote scenario, a plausible one. After conducting almost, a week’s long unprecedented live military drills around Taiwan in retaliation to the Pelosi’s visit, China published its 3rd White Paper titled "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era," to reiterate the fact that Taiwan is part of China and to demonstrate the resolve of the CPC for national reunification. The condescending tone of the white paper and the reiteration by Xi in his opening remarks of 20th Party Congress come as a warning to Taiwan and the United States that the mainland is now much stronger to solve the Taiwan problem, even by forceful means, if necessary, to fulfil the national rejuvenation, Xi’s Grand strategy.
A careful study of the Sino American relations after the historic thaw of 1970s and the major turning points in the last forty years shows that “without powerful, practical reasons for pragmatic accommodation and cooperation, strong and often deeply rooted and enduring differences between the two governments and their broader societies were likely to emerge (Sutter 2018)” time and again in a way not conducive for global peace and security. Even in the best of circumstances, those divisions often obstruct the Sino-American relations from improving.
Robert G Sutter in his book US-Chinese relations: Perilous past, pragmatic present has succinctly underlined the disagreement between the US and China in the 21st century from both the perspectives. Based on Chinese statements and commentary in official Chinese media, Sutter (2018) broadly puts the disagreement (as perceived by China) in four categories. These are:
(1) Opposition to US support for Taiwan and to US diplomatic and other involvement with other sensitive sovereignty issues, including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Chinese territorial disputes with neighbors along China’s eastern and southern maritime borders.
(2) Opposition to actual or perceived US efforts to change China’s political system.
(3) Opposition to the United States playing the dominant strategic role along China’s periphery in Asia, including US military involvement in Taiwan and military activities in disputed and other territory along China’s rim; and
(4) Opposition to many aspects of US leadership in world affairs.
On the other hand, Sutter also traces the source of disagreement from American side. He categorizes the US differences with China on economic, security, political, sovereignty, and foreign policy issues.
(1) Economic issue focuses on inequities in the US economic relationship with China. This includes a massive trade deficit in favour of China. Instances of Chinese currency manipulation, China’s record of intellectual property rights enforcement and wide use of industrial espionage targeting US firms.
(2) Security issues focus on increased military buildup of China and the threat they pose to US interests in Taiwan and the broader Indo-Pacific region.
(3) Political issues include China’s controversial record on human rights, democracy, religious freedom, and family planning practices. The disputes over the status of Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. China’s claim in South China and East China sea that involve maritime transit and security issues of importance to the United States and its allies.
(4) Foreign policy disputes focus on China’s support for states deviating from US-backed norms and liberal democratic world order. For example, North Korea, Sudan, Myanmar (Burma), Iran, Syria, Cuba, Zimbabwe, and Venezuela. Russia is emerging as the latest flashpoint. Chinese trade, investment, and aid involving resource-rich and poorly governed states in Africa and other parts of the developing world, which undermines Western sanctions and other measures designed to pressure these governments to reform.
The brief overview listed above points to the basic difference which both the sides place on in their fundamental conception of the world. The conflicting interests and values have formed the basis of Sino American relations since the establishment of PRC in 1949.
III. The Clash of Worldviews: American Exceptionalism vs Chinese Exceptionalism
The US policy and practices towards China is reflective of its values-based approach which seeks change in China as per the standards set by the US, which is the major cause of clash between the two countries. China argues for a greater policy pragmatism from the US side to accommodate Chinese distinctiveness. This attitude is also reflective of the broader public opinion in the US which is disinclined to accept China “until and unless it accommodates satisfactorily to US values and norms.” This prompts the US policy makers to take actions in morally correct terms, often downplaying or ignoring the negative implications it may have on China and its interests.
Chinese scholar underscores that Americans seem to have a “Chinese dream” and a desire to transform China to fit the US model, regarding China as a market with unlimited business opportunities and vast potential. One of the major factors in the friction between the US and China is the difference between the countries themselves. As Kissinger (2011) puts that these differences are multi-faceted and include history, culture, religious traditions, ethnic make-up, population, geography, and regional environment, as well as social, political, and economic systems, their levels of development, and other dimensions. These differences can be broadly put into following rubrics:
(a) Social systems: the US and China have radically different social systems including political and economic systems which is rooted in their respective historical and cultural traditions. In case of China one can say that China’s social system has been under constant change since the twentieth century. Its evolution is the story of revolutions and reforms with profound and at times dramatic changes. Although the current socialist system with Chinese characteristics has long been in place, it is still not mature and reforms continue, as Chinese scholars emphasise. Whereas the social system of the US is more stable. Since its founding, it has undergone several major revisions and has a stable political system which is liberal democracy. The two countries have different economic system as well, the US being a capitalist country with free market economy whereas China has state-controlled economy (capitalism with Chinese characteristics). These differences at the basic level are often the reason of miscommunication and mutual trust deficit. For ex: if the president Biden says that Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is a personal one and the government has no role in it. It is difficult for China to trust these words because in Chinese political system, it simply does not exist. Therefore, China believes that there is a difference between words and actions and retaliates.
(b) Norms and Values: The other important difference is the difference in terms of social values which both the countries manifest. Human rights for example. Chinese concept is human right is diametrically opposite to what the US hold. They argue that “Chinese people, having suffered wars, natural disasters, and poverty since modern times, value the right to subsistence and development and are used to a collective mindset” (Baijia 2020). Chinese collective mindset is opposite to American individualism which they regard as the foundation of society which manifests in their approach to value individual freedom and rights.
On the matter of democracy, again the interpretations are different at both the sides and so is their pursuit of democracy. China emphasises that their basis of democracy is based on consensus through consultation among people with different views, whereas Americans believe in the right to vote and freedom of expression. There is also difference in perception about public and private. The Chinese traditionally see public power as a force for good, respect it, and trust it with all kinds of responsibilities (ibid). In American perception private prevails over public and they regard public power as an indispensable evil that should be checked and restricted.
The differences at these basic levels are prevalent in both the society and their perception of ‘self” which then reflects in their approach towards each other in the international arena. One may argue that China is modernization and getting integrated into the international system, but does that mean there will be changes in the society?
(C) American Exceptionalism vs Chinese Exceptionalism
American exceptionalism has been historically referred to as the belief that the United States differs qualitatively from other developed nations because of its national credo, historical evolution, or distinctive political and religious institutions. Most references presumes that America's values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. It also implies that the US is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage.
On the contrary, the Chinese exceptionalism is the perception of greatness, which is not being derived from any institutional religion (like the US) rather it is linked to a sense of "being chosen by Heaven". The very sense of national identity is bound up with its location of being located at the centre of the world. According to Chiang Kai-shek, the name Central Kingdom was not just a geographical and cultural concept but was also loaded with political meaning. It was said that whoever controlled the Central Kingdom, would be the legitimate ruler over tianxia. Eminent Chinese scholar John Fairbank notes that since 1978, "modernization" has been China's national goal, and that the Chinese people's "residual conviction of their innate superiority" had resulted in the "high drama of a great people making a modem comeback." Gilbert Rozman notes Chinese confidence as being (1) the source and authentic bearer of civilization that (its neighbours) borrowed, (2) the defining authority and ritual centre in a hierarchical regional system, and (3) derived from its large population area.
The Washington-Beijing rivalry is driven by competing ideals and systems of government as much as by competing interests (Brands and Cooper 2021), and their exceptionalism. Biden pledged to put values at the heart of his administration’s China policy. He pledged to convene a global “Summit for Democracy” in order to “forge a common agenda to address threats to our common values.”
One of the arguments which the US has put forward time and again is that more we engage with China and integrate it into the international system, it will eventually lead to the changes in Chinese society, and it may become democratic. Robert Zoellick’s famous 2005 speech urging Beijing to become a responsible stakeholder insisted that “China needs a peaceful political transition to make its government responsible and accountable to its people.”
However, this logic of engagement has failed, so has the engagement failed, as many scholars put it. Scholars and foreign policy practitioner also argue that by using the same engagement, China has become a threat to American led liberal world order. China has been labelled as ‘systemic rival’ now which wants to promote an alternative world order.
So how does Beijing respond to that? Beijing has long suspected that Washington is trying a regime change in China. This makes CCP feel vulnerable in an international order led by democracies and rooted in liberal values. They have long assumed that the US would never view communist party as fully legitimate. Chinese leaders appear to believe that efforts to increase China’s power and influence cannot fully succeed unless the global order becomes one in which an autocratic superpower can flourish (Brands and Cooper 2021). The Chinese support for illiberal regimes and supressing speech condemning the communist regime in democratic countries via economic arm twisting supports the idea that China is trying to export its values (same as the US does in the world) to make world order where authoritarianism can be acceptable.
To further understand Chinese behaviour in international affairs, it is imperative to understand Chinese perception of the world. China suffers from a “victim mentality,” a mind-set that sees China as a victim of imperialism while it regards the Chinese people as an ethnic group bullied and discriminated against by the Westerners (Yang and Mao (2016). This is a nationalistic and anti-Western mentality, based on selective historical memory, provides the Chinese with an understanding of who they are and how they should approach their relationship with the rest of the world (ibid). Sutter (2018) puts it as “a long-standing dark view of foreign affairs strongly propagated by the Chinese government, compels China to sustain and advance national power and independence in order to protect its interests in the face of perceived acquisitive and often duplicitous world powers, notably the United States”.
The Chinese exceptionalism places the PRC clearly in the lead in the small group of countries that view their foreign behaviour in more self-righteous ways than the United States does. Concurrent with the state-fostered “victim mentality,” Beijing promotes a viewpoint that successfully persuades both the Chinese elite and public that China always makes the morally right choices in its foreign policy decisions. Information on China's numerous instances of aggression and coercive tactics is either supressed or controlled. In this view, China is not at fault for any dispute with other countries; rather, they result from the flawed policies of other countries or by the devious manipulation by more power, particularly the United States.
The worldview of any country is reflective of the idiosyncrasy of the leader in power. The worldview of the leader is reflected in his policies. In case of China, it is the worldview of Xi which is getting reflected in the foreign policy practices. His grand strategy is to make China great again. Xi said in 2012 that “the greatest Chinese dream is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” which can be summed up as combining power & prosperity, reclaiming past greatness, to make Chinese population rich, powerful & respected, contest of supremacy in Asia, making China great again (the Grand strategy), Civilizational creed (China at the centre of the universe), making China’s position predominant in Asia as enjoyed before the West intrusion, re-establishing control over the territories of “greater China” (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet), recovering historic sphere of influence along its border & adjacent seas, and commanding the respect of other great powers in the council of the world.
Chinese foreign policy reflects its internal principles of social and political order which is hierarchic and non-egalitarian. It also reflects the elements of Chinese civilizational belief which is ethnocentric & culturally supremacist. The Chinese Confucian social system preaches that the order or harmony is derived from hierarchy (Confucian commandment: know thy place). There is a stark difference between the respective self-perception and conception of world which manifests in Sino-American bilateral relations.
Conclusion: Prospects of Bilateral Relations and Implications for the Global Security
Xi’s rise to power in the political landscape of China with absolute concentration of power alludes to 18th king Louis XIV of France who proclaimed, “L’etat, c’est moi” (I am the state) and with this an absolute control over power. The absolutism eventually ended with French revolution more than a century later, but in Xi’s China it is too premature and early to arrive at any conclusion. However, absolutism of Xi is going to have implications for the rest of the world as economy, military, Communist Party of China, and the Chinese State cannot be distinguished and only one person controls them all, who is an ideologue. China’s wolf warrior diplomacy is the reflection of Xi’s worldview with prestige, righteousness, and pride at the center of policy practices.
The US on other hand, by combining the normative values like democracy, human rights, and morality with geopolitics, seems to promote a Manichean conception of the world divided along right and wrong, friends or foes, black and white, thereby placing a difficult choice for its friends and allies to choose between the US and China, between democracy and authoritarianism. The US also has firm belief in its self-righteousness, morality, and superiority of its way of life. The sense of self-righteousness, narrative on morality, values and ideology have been at the core of the US foreign policy practices. As Brands and Copper contend that purging ideology from American statecraft would be both ahistorical and un-strategic. They further point out that the United States won the Cold War precisely because it put values near the centre of that competition. One may question whether the US is placing values at the core of its competition with China to mobilize its democratic friends for a long struggle, and to exploit its asymmetric advantages vis-à-vis China?
One may question, why should it bother the world? Or why should the global community care? It is just a bilateral relationship; how does it impact the global security?
Economy-Geopolitics-Alliance nexus in Sino-American relations
The Sino-American relations are not just any bilateral relations. It is between number one and number two economic power, two nuclear states, one superpower (established power) and another the contender (rising power). The meteoric rise of China caused structural stress by challenging the world order led by the U.S. as the sole superpower in the post-Cold War. Immediately after WWII, the US accounted to around 50 per cent of the global economic market, which declined to 22 percent by 1980. The decades of double-digit Chinese growth have further reduced the US share to 16 percent (Alison). Over the next three decades the US share of economic output will further decline to just 11 percent if the current trend continues. For the same period, China’s share of global economy soared from 2 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2016 and is projected to become 30 percent in 2040. China’s economic development has transformed it into a formidable political, military, and economic competitor to the US.
The relative decline of the U.S. and the ascendance of China in the global order led to a tectonic shift in the balance of power. From the Thucydidean perspective what makes war more likely than peace is “the growing entitlement of the rising power (China’s), sense of its importance, and demand for greater say and sway, and the fear, insecurity, and determination to defend the status quo this engenders in the established power (the U.S.)”. One may agree or disagree with Alison’s Thucydides trap, as few scholars have discarded it as self-professed prophecy, by considering the growing entitlement of China in world and the U.S. determination to maintain its dominance, the historical analogy seems relevant.
Another key factor from this historical analogy which seems relevant in the ongoing Sino-American rivalry is the alliance entrapment of both parties. The alliance politics of Athens and Sparta (during Peloponnesian war) forced them to get involved in reinforcing its credibility among its allies. Sparta fearing a decline of its influence, rushed to its ally Corinth’s defence prompting Athens to back its ally Corfu. In terms of Joseph Nye, this contest of competitive credibility led Sparta and Athens to a strategic disaster. In context of Indo-Pacific and especially the recent Taiwan Strait crisis, one may question, whether this region is turning into modern Peloponnese? If the US and China go to war over Taiwan issue, which is the most contentious issue in their bilateral relations, it has the potential to drag the entire region into conflict, if alliances are respected.
The interaction pattern between the US and China will determine the dynamics of power play. Whatever these differing views and approaches of major/minor players may be, the countries are intertwined in a complex web of security and economic relations. The new alliance system is so complex and entangled that it is difficult to bifurcate the allegiance. Countries are mostly aligning with China for economic reasons and the U.S. for security reasons. These organisations have the presence of either China or the U.S. or both in some way or the other. In case of potential clash between the US and China, it would be very difficult for other countries to choose, as Singaporean diplomat puts it, it’s to choose between economy and security.
Given the present situation between the two countries, the prospect of cooperation seems dim. In retaliation to Pelosi’s visit, China suspended halt cooperation with the United States on critical areas including military and climate change.
Trade and Tech War:
The geopolitical considerations and interest calculation combined with the perceived gap in values between China and the United States, led the Trump administration to launch a trade war against China since 2018, with domino effect in other area, mainly the cutting-edge technology. Coupled with other contentious bilateral politico-economic issues, like the ongoing bilateral trade war, the South China Sea issue, Ukraine war, Taiwan issue and the restructuring of global and regional order, the tech war has generated profound and lasting impacts on the development of China-U.S. relations, with the US trying to protect its domination in the field of advance tech (like AI) and preventing China to catch up. The world has officially entered the AI war with China launching its AI model Deep Seek, which offers a competitive alternative to the US dominated existing AI models like OpenAI’s ChatGPT. This has potential to seriously harm global economy, strategic stability, and future of mankind.
In further deterioration of bilateral relations, the US Department of Commerce has implemented new export controls on advanced computing and semiconductor to China. As per new controls, the companies are required to receive a license to export US-made advanced computing and semiconductor products to China. Bureau of Industry and Security release states that the purpose of the export controls is to “protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests” and will “restrict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) ability to both purchase and manufacture certain high-end chips used in military applications.”
The move has been condemned by China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) stating that “The actions of the US side not only affect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies but also damage the legitimate business interests of US export companies” and added that “The United States should immediately stop its wrongdoing and give fair treatment to companies from all over the world, including Chinese companies”.
The ongoing technological war and trade war against China is the product of the differences between China and the United States in their respective political values and geopolitical pursuits, as well as their rivalry on regional and global arenas. China alleges that the US intends to force China to abandon its policies in high-tech industries and technology transfer from foreign enterprises, to maintain its global supremacy, while the US maintains that China doesn’t play by fair rule book and hence the US needs to act to secure itself and its foreign policy interests.
However, both the sides need to understand that a zero-sum approach towards each other will profoundly impact the development of the bilateral relationship and even the future trends of world politics and economy.
Furthermore, the actual and perceived security threat has led to increasing investment in national defense and arms building on both the side, particularly in such new areas as cyberspace and artificial intelligence (AI), which further adds to global strategic instability and arms race. Moreover, the U.S. trade sanctions against China is not conducive for the existing industrial chains in East Asia.
The pragmatic need of the hour is to work on the prospects of mutually beneficial cooperation between China and the United States, especially in the advanced science and technology domain. There is an urgent need of global governance in the field of science and technology given the fact that new technologies like AI have potential to be used by the state and the non-state actors in harmful ways. For example, the lethal autonomous weapon system like AI driven drones is likely to be used by terrorist groups to launch attacks on their target countries. The US and China have the potential to collaborate and cooperate in this area of common concern for global good. They can work together to build international control system for such weapons at multilateral level.
Furthermore, to minimize the negative impacts of their strategic competition on global industrial chain, either side should not intervene in global economic resources allocation.
China has been labelled as the “most serious long-term challenge to the international order” the previous US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The present Secretary of State in the second Trump administration, Marco Rubio has the reputation of being the most hawkish policymaker on China. He too believes that China’s authoritarian model poses a systemic challenge to liberal democracies and U.S. global leadership.
China, as Xi mentioned in speech during the 20th Party Congress in 2022, has already emerged as an alternative to Western democracies led by the United States. The global community is cautiously watching as the two system clashes for dominance. Whether they are going to be just the competitors or transform into engagers or decide to take a mid-way, only time will tell.