The Taiwan Dilemma: Sovereignty, Security, and Strategic Ambiguity
Abstract
This report argues that Taiwan should aim to avoid violent reunification, and secondly also to avoid peaceful reunification with China. Firstly, Taiwanese policymakers should uphold their policy of de facto independence by refraining from a formal declaration of independence, avoiding risking triggering a Chinese military invasion. Secondly, Taiwan should bolster its defensive capabilities by bolstering its military deterrence, particularly focusing on decentralised ‘porcupine’ defense strategies that acknowledge Chinese military superiority. Thirdly, Taiwan should strengthen its alliances, particularly because of the newfound isolationist and transactional approach of United States (US) Republican administrations. Fourthly, Taiwan should foster national unity and internal cohesion to reduce domestic susceptibility to Chinese attempts to influence Taiwanese public and political opinion towards reunification. Fifthly, Taiwan should lessen its economic reliance on China by expanding its economic ties with allies and enhancing its strategic autonomy and vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion. Finally, Taiwan should further emphasise and increase its economic, political and security value to the US, particularly under an isolationist and transactional Republican party.
The current tensions in Taiwan-China relations, where China seeks reunification with Taiwan and Taiwan opposes this, are rooted in historical, political and ideological factors. Understanding the objectives of both sides and the implications of possible scenarios is crucial to assessing future cross-strait relations. Global geopolitical dynamics are affected significantly by these tensions, and the international community's role will play a key role in future outcomes.
Several recent developments in cross-strait relations have contributed to the increasingly tense relationship between Taiwan and China and the possibility of reunification. Firstly, the US breaking of their ‘strategic ambiguity’ policy under the Biden administration has angered China, with uncertainty surrounding the policy of future US administrations, particularly under the Republican Party. Secondly, the re-election of the Democratic Progressive Party, continuing the status quo policy of de facto independence has angered China. Thirdly, China has increased its military and diplomatic attacks on Taiwan.
Origins/Historical Context
The Taiwan-China dispute can be traced back to the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), ending with the victory of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] and the establishment of the People's Republic of China [PRC] on mainland China. The defeated Kuomintang Party [KMT] retreated to Taiwan, where they maintained they were the legitimate government of all of China. Since then, Taiwan has developed its own national identity and democratic political system, while the PRC has maintained its claim over the island under its one-China policy, considering it a breakaway province. Between 1949 and 1971, Taiwan’s government, under the name Republic of China, was recognised widely as representing China (United Nations, 1971) including in the UN, after which most states switched to recognising the PRC as representing China (Australian Government, 2021). This paper defines a state as having a population, defined territory and a government, having the capacity to enter into legal relations with other states and identifying itself as a state (United States, 1933).
Chinese Objectives of Reunification and the ‘One China’ Policy
The PRC's primary aim is to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, seeing it as a matter of core national interest and territorial integrity, and aiming to complete this by 2049 (Blanchette, Boland and McElwee, 2023). Furthermore, China’s anti-secession law explicitly threatens to attack Taiwan if it seeks formal independence (National People's Congress, 2005: 1-2), and lists reunification as a core national interest (Blanchette, Boland and McElwee, 2023).
China has a far more powerful military than Taiwan, however, the threat of the US and their regional allies defending Taiwan has been a significant factor in China building up its military, including substantial modernisation and conducting regular exercises simulating an invasion (Lin, 2022: 26-28). Furthermore, it has built up its cyber capabilities to strike Taiwan’s critical national infrastructure (Lin, 2022: 28) weakening its ability to respond to any attack. China has also engaged in political warfare, targeting Taiwan’s political stability and public morale through propaganda, misinformation, targeting Taiwanese politicians, and suppressing views it opposes (Kuo and Staats, 2024) along with attempting to sway public opinion towards reunification (Lin, 2022: 28). The PRC therefore isolates Taiwan diplomatically by pressuring states and international organisations to recognise the PRC as the only legitimate government of China to weaken Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic and military ties, hurting Taiwan if China attacked.
All these strategies also aim to coerce Taiwan into acquiescing to Chinese demands and accepting peaceful reunification. This is a far cheaper, more peaceful, and less geopolitically damaging outcome for China.
Taiwan’s Objective of Autonomy and Sovereignty
Taiwan seeks to maintain a distinct way of life without succumbing to Chinese control. Taiwan’s democratic governance is a core notion of its identity with strong public support (Gubbala and Fetterolf, 2024), characterised by free elections, robust civil society, and protection of human rights and freedoms (Freedom House, 2022) strongly contrasting with China (Freedom House, 2024). However, it is economically dependent on China, with a large reliance on trade with it (Hsieh, 2020: 69-71), and restricted in its ties internationally due to its lack of formal independence and Chinese pressure on nations to break ties with Taiwan (Schneider, 2020; Lin, 2021). Despite this, it has built some independence by manufacturing high-tech goods to a large degree (Varadarajan et al., 2021) and developing ties with international partners, including informal ties with the US and South Korea (Masters and Merrow, 2024; Global Taiwan Institute, 2023) and increased ties with ASEAN nations (Ku, 2017: 268-272) and Europe (Agence France Presse, 2024; European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan, 2021; European Commission, 2023).
Taiwan’s Objective of International Recognition
Taiwan’s effort to gain greater international recognition and participation in global organisations despite PRC opposition is difficult, with the pressure the PRC can apply as a major power limiting international recognition of Taiwan (Schneider, 2020; Lin, 2021). Most states do not recognise it as a country (Australian Government, 2021). However, many large powers maintain unofficial ties including diplomatic (Ratiu, 2022), trade (World Trade Organization, 2023), and military (Rickards, 2024), including the US, the EU, Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under the New Southbound Policy (Ku, 2017: 268-272). Taiwan is limited to membership of a few international institutions like the World Trade Organization (World Trade Organization, 2023), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2024), although under the name ‘Chinese Taipei’ due to Chinese pressure. To counterbalance Chinese influence, Taiwan has attempted to increase international recognition by highlighting what it brings to the international community, including democracy, human rights, a robust economy to trade with, technological advancements and successful crisis management (Ratiu, 2022).
Taiwan's objective of De Facto independence
Taiwan has never formally declared independence from China (Saul, 2022). Rather it argues it has sovereignty over all of China and not the PRC. It meets some conditions of statehood (United States, 1933), including a population, defined territory and a government, but lacks others like the capacity to enter into legal relations with other states as most states don’t accept it has the legal status of a state (Australian Government, 2021). Most importantly, it cannot be a state that is independent from China because it has not formally declared itself one. All major Taiwanese parties oppose a formal declaration of independence from China (Saul, 2022). This is because declaring independence would not only damage an economy dependent on heavy trade with China (Hsieh, 2020: 69-71) but also lead to a more likely chance of triggering a military conflict with China. In addition, de facto independence is supported by a majority of Taiwanese people (Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 2024) and allies (Saul, 2022), and declaring formal independence potentially complicates Taiwanese geopolitical relations with other nations under Chinese pressure to not recognise Taiwanese independence.
Strategic ambiguity under different US administrations
The US has until recently maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity supporting Taiwanese self-defence and maintaining unofficial ties under the Taiwan Relations Act (96th Congress, 1979) while not explicitly committing to its defence (Crabtree, 2024), which has successfully both deterred PRC aggression and unilateral Taiwanese independence. However, the US has seen bipartisan moves towards a more hawkish China policy, culminating in the Biden administration explicitly stating it would defend Taiwan if China attacked it (Crabtree, 2024).
Further demonstrating support, US House Speakers have visited Taiwan twice since 2020, with China reacting aggressively and with severe condemnation (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). After Nancy Pelosi’s visit, they launched a four-day military drill and conducted live-fire exercises surrounding Taiwan, simulating a blockade (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). Chinese military aircraft crossed the median line separating China and Taiwan by sea over three hundred times during these drills and continue to cross it on a nearly daily (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024), effectively erasing the status quo of aggression. It has applied additional pressure through sanctions, halted exports, and, allegedly, cyberattacks (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). It has continued to intensify threatening air manoeuvres, flying more frequently and closer to Taiwan, and Chinese warships have increasingly joined in the movements (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). Biden’s remarks, while later clarified or walked back by officials (Parker and Pager, 2022), have raised questions about whether the US is moving away from strategic ambiguity. It is unclear whether future Democrat administrations would support strategic ambiguity or Biden’s stance.
Meanwhile, the US approach to strategic ambiguity under Donald Trump and the Republican Party would likely change, with an emphasis on unpredictability, transactionalism and isolationism (Löfflmann et al. 2023: 121-122). This Republican isolationist approach, emphasised by claims Taiwan should pay the US for its self-defence (Davidson, 2024), suggests under Republicans Taiwan’s defence would be seen as a transactional, service-for-fee arrangement. Under this scenario, Taiwanese security could become dependent on its economic value or transactional benefit to the US. Furthermore, Republicans have a record of opposing large-scale foreign aid to support allies, including with Ukraine (Stent, 2024).
Republican actions toward Taiwan have been unpredictable and untraditional. Chinese anger was raised significantly early in his term when Trump took a call from the Taiwanese president, the first US president to do so since Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing (Jett, 2024). Asked whether the US would defend Taiwan militarily under his administration, Trump stated “he wouldn’t have to”, because Xi “respects me and knows I'm f—--- crazy” (Taranto, 2024 cited in Jett, 2024). Furthermore, this suggests under Trump the US may take less action towards supporting Taiwan, believing China would never invade Taiwan due to a fear of a perceived volatility by Trump. This could lead Taiwan to further develop its defences and alliances away from the US. Meanwhile, the lack of clear, reliable US backing of Taiwan could lead China to increase military aggression, economic coercion and diplomatic isolation, confident the US would be unlikely to intervene.
Taiwanese elections and Chinese response
In the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was re-elected under William Lai Ching-te for a third time (Thornton, 2024). The DPP is evenly matched with the Kuomintang Party, who support reunification but not under the rule of the CCP (Oyen, 2024), and the smaller Taiwan People’s Party who seek to maintain the status quo and hold tiebreaking power in the Taiwanese parliament (Thornton, 2024).
While China began with a relatively restrained response, with claims of foreign interference, insisting reunification was inevitable and the DPP did not represent the Taiwanese people, it has escalated (Staats and Kuo, 2024). This included increased military drills and exercises, along with diplomatic aggression like moving commercial air routes closer to the median line, increased surveillance behaviour and aggressive behaviour in Taiwan’s Kinmen islands including sending in coast guard ships (Staats and Kuo, 2024).
Increased Chinese military and diplomatic attacks
China has continued to intensify military and diplomatic attacks against Taiwan, only further encouraged by Taiwanese elections and changing US support. China frequently enters Taiwanese air and maritime territory (Staats and Kuo, 2024), conducting naval and air exercises that aim to intimidate Taiwan and its allies into accepting reunification peacefully and simulating an invasion. Diplomatic attacks on Taiwan have included the previously mentioned responses to Taiwan’s election, but also generally increasingly firmer public statements, like in February when it switched from demanding other states oppose Taiwanese independence to demanding they explicitly support peaceful reunification (Staats and Kuo, 2024).
In addition, Beijing has recently made statements that it should more actively push for reunification, including grasping the ‘strategic initiative’ (Staats and Kuo, 2024), describing Chinese views on Taiwanese separatism as ‘combat’ rather than just ‘opposing’ (Staats and Kuo, 2024), and more explicitly warning of reunification (Welker et al., 2023).
What are the implications if China invades Taiwan?
Taiwan is a major and central part of the First Island Chain, a series of archipelagos vital for strategic military and trade routes (O’Hanlon and Yeo, 2023). Control over Taiwan would allow the PRC to project power deeper into the Pacific challenging US and allied positions, including disrupting vital maritime lanes.
The security of Taiwan is critical to the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific, impacting relations with Japan, South Korea, and other regional allies who view Taiwan's stability and restricting Chinese expansionism as crucial to their security. Not only are these nations geographically close to Taiwan but rely heavily on sea lanes that could come under Chinese influence (Uren, 2022). The US has committed to defend or support many Asian allies in the event of an attack (Meijer, 2020: 170) under a ‘security umbrella’ to protect its economic, strategic and ideological interests, and so any Chinese invasion of Taiwan would likely foster increasing security cooperation between the US and its security allies.
China would likely be emboldened by a successful invasion, signalling the fall of US deterrence and military ability and emboldening China to further assert its territorial claims and influence over neighbouring states. It would signal the ability of the Chinese military to achieve Chinese geopolitical goals, potentially leading to increased aggression in other disputed territories like the South China Sea (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023) and the acquiescence of more regional nations to Chinese interests. A significant proportion of world trade passes through the Taiwan Strait, with 88% of the largest 10% of world shipping by tonnage passing through the strait (Uren, 2022), with Chinese control of the strait increasing its geopolitical power and potentially heavily damaging the Taiwanese economy. Conversely, continued tension in the area could damage the Chinese economy if global actors reduce trade flow.
This combination of increased Chinese influence and increasing deterrence efforts by the US alliance system, whether the US sends troops or not, would lead to an escalation of military activities and rhetoric, raising the risk of miscalculation and potential conflict, potentially drawing in regional and global powers, and leading to widespread insecurity. Under a Republican administration however, it is unclear whether Republicans would give increased support to Taiwan, send troops or fund Taiwan’s defence, as with Ukraine (Stent, 2024), despite Taiwan’s large importance to America economically and technologically (Uren, 2022; Varadarajan et al., 2021; Jones et al., 2023: 4).
What are the implications if the status quo continues?
The security dilemma between China and Taiwan and its allies would continue. A security dilemma is described here related to as John Herz described it, where state A acts to increase their security or achieve their geopolitical goals, making state B feel insecure and increase their deterrence capabilities, therefore making state A increase their capabilities, hence repeating the cycle (Herz, 1950: 157).
This is based on Chinese attempts to encourage the US, Taiwan and allies to acquiesce to an attack on Taiwan thus leading these actors to act to deter China from this attack, and therefore China increasing its capabilities. The PRC will continue to enhance its military capabilities and Taiwan will receive increased arms sales and defence support from the US beyond what it has received (Masters and Merrow, 2024).
Regionally, under the US alliance system and security umbrella, Asian allies like Japan and South Korea will attempt to further their geopolitical ties with Taiwan and the US in diplomatic, trade and military areas. They will continue to increase trade and increase cooperation in joint exercises, intelligence sharing and defence initiatives to strengthen regional deterrence of Chinese aggression. However, under a Republican administration, it is more likely that America will only undertake these actions when it sees a direct transactional economic and security benefit to itself, such as ensuring exports from Taiwan reach America.
What are the global implications?
Taiwan is critical in the broader US-China strategic competition. Any conflict over Taiwan could escalate into a broader confrontation between these major powers and increase Chinese aggression worldwide.
Taiwan’s right to sovereignty is based on principles of international law, including self-determination and the proper use of force (United Nations, 1960). The global response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan could set precedents for global territorial disputes and broader issues affected by international law. It would signal a lack of adherence to international law and norms and the rise of authoritarian regimes.
Taiwan also plays a major role in global supply chains, especially in high-tech manufacturing (Varadarajan et al., 2021). The disruption of its stability could have severe economic impacts globally, affecting industries that are reliant on Taiwanese technology and production capability. As previously noted, a significant proportion of world trade passes through the Taiwan Strait, with 88% of the largest 10% of world shipping by tonnage passing through the strait (Uren, 2022), with any disruption to this threatening the world economy.
Recommendations for Taiwanese Policymakers
Taiwan’s utmost goal should be to avoid violent reunification, and secondly also to avoid peaceful reunification. Firstly, Taiwanese policymakers should continue their policy of de facto independence, meaning they continue to never formally declare independence (Saul, 2022). Declaring formal independence would not only damage Taiwan's somewhat China-reliant economy (Hsieh, 2020: 69-71) but lead to a more likely chance of triggering Chinese anger and military conflict. It also potentially complicates Taiwanese geopolitical relations with other nations under Chinese pressure not to recognise Taiwanese independence.
Secondly, Taiwan should strengthen its defensive capabilities, deterring an invasion by modernising its military through traditional military build-up as well as focusing on the most effective modes of defence, focusing on defending Chinese invaders once they have landed and decentralised defence (Dotson, 2024), acknowledging China’s military superiority. Whether under a Democratic or Republican administration, US military support in the event of an invasion is not guaranteed, particularly under a Republican administration. Furthermore, Taiwan has continued to develop decentralised military strategies to deter an invasion, focused on mobility, dispersion and cost-effective systems. For example, the ‘Overall Defense Concept’ leverages Taiwan’s geography with small, mobile and lethal platforms that are harder to target (Hsi-min and Lee, 2020). Exercises like the 2024 Han Kuang drill highlight this shift, where small units are trained to operate independently with decentralised command (Dotson, 2024). Taiwan’s defence procurements align with this, focusing on mobile missiles, UAVs and guerilla-style tactics to develop Taiwan into a ‘porcupine’ (Timbie and O Ellis Jr, 2021: 84-93). These decentralised, ‘porcupine’ approaches have worked throughout history to prevent invasions from superpowers, including failed US and Soviet invasions of Afghanistan (Ewans, 2004: 146) and the US invasion of Vietnam (Ringler, 2024: 4-9).
Thirdly, it should enhance its alliances, as leveraging regional partnerships will be critical to supporting Taiwan, particularly in the event of a transactional and isolationist Trump administration. This is despite it being difficult for Taiwan to develop trade relations with other states due to its lack of status as formally independent and Chinese pressure on nations to break ties with Taiwan (Schneider, 2020; Lin, 2021). Emphasising what support for Taiwanese de facto independence does for the interests of these nations is integral to highlight in the neorealist international system. In this system, the lack of an overarching international body creates a system where the distribution of capabilities and anarchical national interest operate, and states will act first and foremost in their own self-interest. Nations facing Chinese aggression, like Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea (Blazevic, 2012: 80) and Japan and South Korea that face threats to the sovereignty of their mainland (Arshid Iqbal Dar and Yaqoob Ul Hassan, 2023: 8), are interested in reducing Chinese power and standing for supporting liberal concepts like the rule of law that protect their self-interest. So do Western allies of Taiwan that fear losing geopolitical influence to China and economic influence, for example through Chinese control of semiconductor production (Jones et al., 2023: 3; Diamond, O. Ellis Jr and Schell, 2023).
Therefore, Taiwan should increase defence and security cooperation with nations like South Korea, Japan and Australia through joint training exercises, intelligence sharing and arms deals, and strengthen ties throughout Asia by promoting themselves as a stabilising force. This is despite Taiwan’s lack of formal relationships in the region due to the pressure of China (Ku, 2017: 273). For example, Taiwan has increased informal intelligence, dialogue and cybersecurity cooperation with South Korea (Global Taiwan Institute, 2023) and increased purchases of US weapons (Masters and Merrow, 2024). Additionally, it has sought participation in ASEAN-led forums as a ‘stabilising force’, along with increasing economic, educational and cultural ties with these nations (Ku, 2017: 268-272). Furthermore, it has increased informal diplomacy and technological cooperation with European nations (Agence France Presse, 2024; European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan, 2021), and increased economic ties with Taiwan, now the European Union's fifth biggest trading partner (European Commission, 2023). It should continue to highlight the dominance and importance it has in many areas including the critical technological sector (Jones et al., 2023: 4; Varadarajan et al., 2021). The disruption of its stability could have severe economic impacts globally, affecting industries that are reliant on Taiwanese technology and production capability. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, a significant proportion of world trade passes through the Taiwan Strait, with 88% of the largest 10% of world shipping by tonnage passing through the strait (Uren, 2022), with any disruption to this threatening the world economy.
Fourthly, Taiwan should continue to promote national unity and internal cohesion, ensuring its population and political system are less vulnerable to Chinese influence. This should involve fostering a strong sense of shared identity and purpose among its citizens, emphasising democracy, self-determination, Taiwanese values and national pride. Additionally, it should bolster civil society and strengthen its national institutions, helping Taiwan to resist Chinese influences and maintain stability.
Fifthly, Taiwan should reduce its large-scale reliance on China economically (Hsieh, 2020: 69-71), deepening ties with the rest of Asia and the West, thus allowing for greater strategic autonomy and less vulnerability to economic coercion by China. To do this, it should diversify trade by expanding agreements with the European Union, the US and Asian allies, leveraging areas of economic strength like semiconductor production, particularly where there is a fear of a Chinese takeover of production (Jones et al., 2023:3; (Diamond, O. Ellis Jr and Schell, 2023).
Finally, Taiwan should increase its economic, political and security value to the US, particularly under an isolationist Republican party more explicitly focused on what Taiwan would offer the US, if the US would military and diplomatically support it. This includes expanding arms purchases from US manufacturers, supporting the American defence industry and American employment. Taiwan could additionally deepen collaboration in high-tech sectors like semiconductors by offering joint ventures or preferential deals with US companies, ensuring access to Taiwanese technology. In addition, Taiwan could increase imports of US agricultural and energy products, aligning with Trump’s focus on trade surpluses.
Conclusion
The ongoing tensions between Taiwan and China, driven by China’s pursuit of reunification and Taiwan’s resistance, stem from deep-rooted historical, political, and ideological factors. Analysing the objectives of both sides and the potential outcomes is essential for understanding the future trajectory of cross-strait relations. Additionally, the Taiwan Strait plays a pivotal role in global geopolitical dynamics, with control over this critical waterway carrying far-reaching implications. International responses to these tensions will likely have a profound impact on the evolution of Taiwan-China relations.
Recent developments in Taiwan-China relations have heightened tensions and raised concerns about the possibility of a Chinese invasion. Firstly, the US has shifted from its policy of 'strategic ambiguity' under the Biden administration, angering China and creating uncertainty about the stance of future US administrations, particularly under Republicans. Secondly, the re-election of Taiwan's DPP, who continue to support de facto independence, has further provoked China. Thirdly, China has escalated both military and diplomatic pressure on Taiwan.
This report contends Taiwan should strive to avoid violent reunification, and secondly also to avoid peaceful reunification with China. Firstly, Taiwan should continue its policy of de facto independence to avoid risking triggering a Chinese military invasion. Secondly, Taiwan should enhance its defensive strength by modernising its military and enhancing its decentralised defence strategy to deter a Chinese invasion. Thirdly, Taiwan should build robust alliances with regional and international allies, especially in countering challenges that may arise for Taiwan with a newfound isolationist and transactional Republican US administration. Fourthly, Taiwan should build national unity and internal cohesion to help mitigate vulnerabilities to attempts by China to influence its political system and society in favour of reunification. Fifthly, Taiwan should minimise its economic reliance on China by diversifying its economic ties and strengthening economic relationships with regional and international partners. Finally, Taiwan should increase and emphasise its economic, political and security to the US, particularly under an isolationist and transactional US Republican party.
Bibliography
Agence France Presse (2024). Taiwan Foreign Minister Stops in Brussels for European Parliament Visit. [online] Barrons.com. Available at: https://www.barrons.com/news/taiwan-foreign-minister-stops-in-brussels-for-european-parliament-visit-e017c9a6 [Accessed 29 Nov. 2024].
Arshid Iqbal Dar and Yaqoob Ul Hassan (2023). USA, QUAD and China’s Inevitable Taiwan Invasion: NATOization or Chinese Hegemony in Indo-Pacific. Millennial Asia, 0(0). doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/09763996231162504.
Australian Government (2021). Australia-Taiwan relationship. [online] Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/taiwan/australia-taiwan-relationship#:~:text=Currently%20Taiwan%20has%2012%20diplomatic.
Blanchette, J., Boland, B. and McElwee, L. (2023). What Is Beijing’s Timeline for ‘Reunification’ with Taiwan? [online] CSIS: Interpret China. Available at: https://interpret.csis.org/what-is-beijings-timeline-for-reunification-with-taiwan/.
Blazevic, J.J. (2012). Navigating the Security Dilemma: China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 31(4), pp.79–108. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341203100404.
Council on Foreign Relations (2024). Confrontation over Taiwan. [online] Global Conflict Tracker. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-over-taiwan#RecentDevelopments-2 [Accessed 20 Aug. 2024].
Council on Foreign Relations (2023). Timeline: China’s Maritime Disputes. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/chinasmaritime-disputes.
Crabtree, J. (2024). America’s Strategy of Ambiguity Is Ending Now. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/22/america-biden-foreign-policy-ambiguity-alliances-security-taiwan-nato-china/.
Davidson, H. (2024). Trump Says Taiwan Should Pay the US for Its Defence as ‘it Doesn’t Give Us Anything’. The Guardian. [online] 17 Jul. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/17/donald-trump-taiwan-pay-us-defence-china-national-convention.
Diamond, L., O. Ellis Jr, A.J. and Schell, O. (2023). Silicon Triangle: the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security. [online] Hoover Institution. Available at: https://www.hoover.org/research/silicon-triangle-united-states-taiwan-china-and-global-semiconductor-security
Dotson, J. (2024). The 2024 Han Kuang Exercise—a Small Step Towards More Decentralized Operations for Taiwan’s Military? [online] Global Taiwan Institute, pp.5–8. Available at: https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/08/the-2024-han-kuang-exercise/.
Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (2024). Election Study Center, NCCU-Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainl. [online] esc.nccu.edu.tw. Available at: https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963.
Ewans, M. (2004). Conflict in Afghanistan. 1st ed. [online] London: Routledge. doi:https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203312544.
European Commission (2023). EU Trade Relations with Taiwan. [online] policy.trade.ec.europa.eu. Available at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/taiwan_en.
European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan (2021). The European Union and Taiwan. [online] European External Action Service. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/european-union-and-taiwan_en?s=242#2816 [Accessed 29 Nov. 2024].
Freedom House (2024). China: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report. [online] Freedom House. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedomworld/2024.
Freedom House (2022). Taiwan: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report. [online] Freedom House. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedomworld/2022.
Global Taiwan Institute (2023). Taiwan and South Korea Enhancing Their Engagement as Chinese Aggression Intensifies. Global Taiwan Institute, [online] 8(18), 20 Sep. Available at: https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/09/taiwan-and-south-korea-enhancing-their-engagement-as-chinese-aggression-intensifies/.
Gubbala, S. and Fetterolf, J. (2024). Support for Democracy Is Strong in Hong Kong and Taiwan. [online] Pew Research Center. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/03/19/support-for-democracy-is-strong-in-hong-kong-and-taiwan/.
Herz, J.H. (1950). Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 2(2), pp.157–180. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2009187.
Hsieh, W. (2020). Implications of the U.S.–China Trade War for Taiwan. Asian Economic Papers, [online] 19(1), pp.61–81. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/asep_a_00747.
Hsi-min, L. and Lee, E. (2020). Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained. [online] thediplomat.com. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained/.
Jett, J. (2024). What Trump’s Election Win Means for U.S.-China Ties on Taiwan, Trade and Tech. [online] NBC News. Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trade-taiwan-now-trump-china-braces-volatile-new-era-us-ties-rcna179070.
Jones, L., Krulikowski, S., Lotze, N. and Schreiber, S. (2023). U.S. Exposure to the Taiwanese Semiconductor Industry. [online] US International Trade Commission, pp.1–36. Available at: https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/us_exposure_to_the_taiwanese_semiconductor_industry_508_2024.pdf [Accessed 29 Apr. 2024].
Kuo, N. and Staats, J. (2024). Taiwan’s Democracy Prevailed despite China’s Election Interference. [online] United States Institute of Peace. Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/taiwans-democracy-prevailed-despite-chinas-election-interference.
Lin, S.S. (2021). Taiwan’s Continued Success Requires Economic Diversification of Products and Markets. [online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-continued-success-requires-economic-diversification-of-products-and-markets/.
Lin, Y.Y. (2022). The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis: What Did the August Exercises around Taiwan Accomplish? The Jamestown Foundation, [online] 22(18), pp.26–29. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/the-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis-what-didthe-august-exercises-around-taiwan-accomplish/ [Accessed 24 Apr. 2024].
Löfflmann, G., Skonieczny, A., Biegon, R. (2023). The Trump Shock: Populism and Changing Narratives of US Foreign Policy. In: Giurlando, P., Wajner, D.F. (eds) Populist Foreign Policy. Global Foreign Policy Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22773-8_5
Masters, J. and Merrow, W. (2024). U.S. Military Support for Taiwan in Five Charts. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts.
Meijer, H. (2020). Shaping China’s rise: the reordering of US alliances and defence partnerships in East Asia. International Politics, 57(2), pp.166–184. doi:https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-019-00201-y.
Mishra, V. and Yao, K. (2024). Trump to Unleash Nearly 40% Tariffs on China in Early 2025, Hitting growth: Reuters Poll. Reuters. [online] 20 Nov. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/trump-unleash-nearly-40-tariffs-china-early-2025-hitting-growth-2024-11-20/.
National People's Congress (2005). Full Text of Anti-Secession Law. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/dcn2005042601/d-cn2005042601en.pdf [Accessed 23 Jul. 2024].
O’Hanlon, M. and Yeo, A. (2023). Geostrategic Competition and Overseas Basing in East Asia and the First Island Chain. [online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/geostrategic-competition-and-overseas-basing-in-east-asia-and-the-first-island-chain/.
Oyen, M. (2024). Taiwanese Election May Determine Whether Beijing Opts to Force the Issue of Reunification. [online] The Conversation. Available at: https://theconversation.com/taiwanese-election-may-determine-whether-beijing-opts-to-force-the-issue-of-reunification-217955 [Accessed 20 Aug. 2024].
Parker, A. and Pager, T. (2022). Analysis | the White House Keeps Walking Back Biden’s Remarks. Washington Post. [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/24/biden-walk-back-remarks/ [Accessed 25 Aug. 2024].
Ku, Samuel (2017)’ 14 Strategies of China’s Expansion and Taiwan’s Survival’ in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective in Dittmer, L. (2017). Taiwan and China : Fitful Embrace. 1st ed. [online] Oakland, California: University Of California Press, pp.249–280. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.17.
Ratiu, A. (2022). Taiwan’s Engagement with the world: Evaluating past hurdles, Present complications, and Future Prospects. [online] Atlantic Council. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/taiwans-engagement-with-the-world/.
Rickards, J. (2024). Lacking: Japanese Security Cooperation with Taiwan. [online] The Strategist. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/lacking-japanesesecurity-cooperation-with-taiwan/.
Ringler, D.S. (2024). Defense Technical Information Center. [online] Dtic.mil. Available at: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA389402 [Accessed 24 Nov. 2024].
Saul, B. (2022). Explainer: the Complex Question of Taiwanese Independence. [online] The Conversation. Available at: https://theconversation.com/explainer-thecomplex-question-of-taiwanese-independence-188584.
Schneider, D. (2020). China-Taiwan Cross-Strait Relations: Evaluating Taiwan’s Response to China’s Reunification Quest. [online] The Institute of World Politics. Available at: https://www.iwp.edu/active-measures/2020/10/22/china-taiwan-cross-strait-relations-evaluating-taiwans-response-to-chinas-reunification-quest/.
Staats, J. and Kuo, N. (2024). After Taiwan’s Election, China Is Now Ratcheting up the Pressure. [online] United States Institute of Peace. Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/after-taiwans-election-china-now-ratcheting-pressure.
Stent, A. (2024). How Would Trump and Harris Handle the Russia-Ukraine war? [online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-would-trump-and-harris-handle-the-russia-ukraine-war/.
Stephanie Christine Winkler (2023). Strategic Competition and US–China Relations: A Conceptual Analysis. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 16(3). doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poad008.
Taranto, J. (2024). Weekend Interview: Trump Tangles with the Journal’s Editors. [online] Wall Street Journal. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/opinion/donald-trump-the-bully-with-a-heart-of-gold-2024-presidential-election-dd922dd6.
96th Congress (1979). Taiwan Relations Act. [online] Congress.Gov. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479/all-info#:~:text=Taiwan%20Relations%20Act%20%2D%20Declares%20it,other%20people%20of%20the%20Western.
Timbie, J. and O Ellis Jr, A.J. (2021). A Large Number of Small Things: A Porcupine Strategy for Taiwan. Texas National Security Review , [online] 5(1). doi:https://doi.org/10.15781/gkaw-3709.
Thornton, M. (2024). Taiwan’s 2024 Election results: Hard Lessons in Resisting Disinformation - LSE Research Online. [online] Lse.ac.uk. doi:http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/122017/1/cff_2024_1_22_taiwans_2024_election_results_hard_lessons_in_resisting_disinformation.pdf.
United Nations (1960). Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. [online] OHCHR. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-grantingindependence-colonial-countries-and-peoples.
Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations.digitallibrary.un.org. [online] Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en&v=pdf.
United States (1933). Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949. [online] Yale.edu. Available at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp.
Uren, D. (2022). A Blockade of Taiwan Would Cripple China’s Economy. [online] The Strategist. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-blockade-of-taiwanwould-cripple-chinas-economy/.
Varadarajan, R., Palma, R., Goodrich, J. and Yinug, F. (2021). Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. [online] BCG Global. Available at: https://www.bcg.com/publications/2021/strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-chain.
Welker, K., Kube, C., Lee, C. and Mitchell, A. (2023). Xi Warned Biden during Summit That Beijing Will Reunify Taiwan with China. [online] NBC News. Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/xi-warned-biden-summit-beijing-will-reunify-taiwan-china-rcna130087 [Accessed 22 Aug. 2024].
White, H. (2022). Taiwan: Biden Risks Talking Himself into a War He Cannot Win | Lowy Institute. [online] www.lowyinstitute.org. Available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/taiwan-biden-risks-talking-himself-war-he-cannot-win.
World Trade Organization (2023). WTO | Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu - Member Information. [online] www.wto.org. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm [Accessed 31 Jul. 2024].