Strengthening Maritime Domain Awareness in the Indo-Pacific: Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain and Awareness
Introduction
Even before the onset of COVID-19, which delivered many unprecedented “twists” to international politics and security, the Indo-Pacific region had always been deemed significant by many due to its obvious strategic importance, ranging from security, military, economy, and even tech-related areas. Thus, on par with the mission of and the direction of the Indo-Pacific Studies Center, led by numerous professionals including Dr. Tuckfield, this paper seeks to address current concerns of maritime security and strategy of the Indo-Pacific by not only grappling with its latest developments of the maritime concerns but also devising smart policy solutions in order to provide apposite policy counsels to many policymakers battling with this complex chess game.
Problem Statement
While there is a plethora of concerns in the Indo-Pacific area, involving legal, cultural, human-rights, geopolitical, military, technological, and so forth, the critical nexus of the said concerns seem to be the maritime security and strategic game, played by, most notably, the United States (U.S.) and its allies believing in the normative and inclusive international order and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To provide feasible policy solutions regarding the feud between two superpowers mentioned above, it is important to understand the origin, and recent developments and future projections. To be specific, first off, the origin of the controversy between the U.S. and PRC maritime concerns would be stated, followed by the recent, framework-related developments for the normative and inclusive international order in the Indo-Pacific, which, most importantly, include the framework of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). Lastly, the paper would identify and investigate the reasons for the bottleneck of the IPMDA in order to recommend the best policy direction while navigating through different Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) agendas and their relevant programs.
The Origin
The maritime feud between the U.S. and PRC cannot be discussed without understanding the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), a set of maritime and naval operations conducted by the United States Navy. Globally, the operations began in the 1970s as a bold statement against any nation challenging the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, it was not until mid 2010s that the routine FONOPs were met with heated PRC rhetoric, blasting the operations based on groundless and outlandish claims that were often self-centered. What sets apart the periods of pre-2010 and mid 2010 is simple: PRC’s increased activities as a part of its revisionist foreign affairs direction. In the early 2010s, China began significantly increasing its activities in the South China Sea, including the construction of artificial islands and military installations in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. These actions raised international concerns as they were seen as attempts by China to assert control over large areas of the South China Sea (SCS), which are subject to overlapping claims by several countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.
Aside from the territorial disputes, the narrow strait of SCS is critical for the international economy to successfully function. To be specific, it is not an exaggeration to say that the SCS is a critical waterway for global trade and energy transportation, with significant economic and strategic importance. Approximately 30% of the world’s maritime trade passes through the South China Sea, which accounts for about 12% of global trade by volume. The total value of goods shipped through the South China Sea is estimated to be between $3.4 trillion and $5.3 trillion annually, with trade routes linking major economies like China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. When it comes to energy-related shipments, the water serves as yet again a vital route, particularly for countries like China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, all of which are economic powerhouses in one area or another. An estimated 15 million barrels of oil are transported through the South China Sea each day, accounting for nearly 30% of global maritime oil trade. The value of oil passing through annually is estimated at $1.2 trillion.
However, while the said numbers are crucial, perhaps the most important factor of the water rests upon independence—both conceptual and actual—of the free, democratic countries in the region, which also contribute tremendously to the world economy and global social structure. In particular, the economies of Southeast Asia, China, and Japan are particularly dependent on the South China Sea for imports and exports. For example, about 80% of China’s crude oil imports pass through the South China Sea. A significant disruption in this region could have severe consequences for global oil prices and trade, which can engender disastrous, hitherto unknown aftermath, especially considering the general recession of the world economy and the subsequent possibilities of armed conflicts for certain nations to escape from such economic pressures and control domestic politics.
In 2015, due to the aforesaid reasons, U.S. began to publicly conduct FONOPs in the South China Sea to challenge China’s rather excessive maritime claims, particularly those associated with the artificial islands, which, if left untreated, could disturb the SCS and the world economy. The first notable FONOP in this campaign occurred in October 2015, when the USS Lassen, a guided-missile destroyer, sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Chinese artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, specifically near Subi Reef. The objective was to demonstrate that the U.S. does not recognize China's claims to territorial waters around artificial islands, which under international law do not grant the same rights as natural islands. These operations were intended to reinforce the principles of freedom of navigation under international law, specifically under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and to signal U.S. opposition to any attempts to restrict navigation rights in the region. Since 2015, the U.S. has continued to conduct regular FONOPs in the South China Sea, challenging not only China’s claims but also any actions by other coastal states that could restrict navigational rights. These operations have become a routine part of U.S. naval activities in the region, underscoring the strategic importance of the SCS as a major global trade route and geopolitical hotspot.
Recent Developments
Indeed, while the origin of the FONOPs and the Sino-U.S. feud per se is worth delving into, it is more urgent to address the recent (during and post COVID-19 years) maritime developments in the region. Recent developments in U.S. and China relations concerning the Indo-Pacific region have centered around strategic maritime issues, some of which overlaps with crucial interests of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)—formed among the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India. Although the QUAD per se is not a military organization, its power stems from its ability to establish a conceptual framework, forged from the member nations’ sublime respect of freedom, adherence to the existing normative and inclusive international order, and their stance against PRC’s attempts to change the regional status quo by force. To materialize the member nations’ common poise to conceptually counter PRC’s revisionist assertiveness in the region, in May of 2022, the QUAD summit in Tokyo saw the heads of the QUAD states officially welcoming the inception of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) to enhance maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region by improving surveillance and information sharing among partner nations.
Ahana Roy, a research associate at Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA), New Delhi, perfectly explains the IMPDA.
Aside from such technical reasons, however, it is also true that the IMPDA was developed as a conceptual nexus of different countermeasures against the Chinese maritime militia, consisting of tens of thousands of otherwise fishing vessels, capable of suddenly turning into makeshift warships. So-called “little blue men” of the sea, the maritime militia is trained and controlled by the PRC military, often being used to reduce transparency and accountability of any PRC maritime actions in the SCS and other Chinese waters. However, the real threat of the “little blue men” is not their existence or objects per se, but their outright dismissal of the international maritime rule, maintained by the use of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), critical for ensuring maritime safety and tracking vessels by providing real-time coverage and map service as per international standard and guidelines.
Granted, PRC is not without reasons. In November of 2021, PRC enacted the “Chinese ships’ use of AIS has dropped significantly since the Chinese government enacted the “Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China” on November 1, 2021. With the new law, PRC devised a firewall, blocking a wide range of “personal information” data from being shared with foreign entities and organizations. However, the lack of AIS signal in the region has become a contentious point as PRC’s move engenders concerns about transparency and the potential for increased maritime accidents or conflicts. The IPMDA initiative is thus perceived by PRC as a challenge to its regional influence, potentially escalating tensions as it could be seen as an effort to counter PRC maritime activities and the irregular maritime militia, which, at the connivance of PRC military and navy, serves its duty very well. Thus far, the juxtaposition of these two maritime concepts highlights future flashpoints in U.S.-China relations as both nations seek to assert control and influence over vital sea lanes and regional security.
Further on the IPMDA
Despite the grandiose fanfare, the IPMDA has been rather quiet. Ever since its inception in May of 2022, IPMDA has remained in its “nascent” stage, due to a few critical reasons. First off, the IPMDA suffers from the lack of common poise, not necessarily the founding member states but from the relevant regional players in accepting the ideals of the QUAD-led IPMDA. Such a lack of flawless cooperation among players creates room for unbalanced information-sharing among the players, which defeats the very purpose of the IMPDA in creating a common operating picture to disseminate due to the emergence of different Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) programs with distinct member states with some overlaps and some exclusions.
Though the IMPDA is initiated and centered by the four QUAD nations, the Indo-Pacific has a legion of important key maritime regions, each responsible for their territorial waters and therefore the peace and stability of the region. Intriguingly, a major key player, Indonesia, has a slightly different view of the normative and inclusive international maritime order. That is, Indonesia is against excluding PRC from the dynamics of regional maritime concerns. Its definition of “inclusive” includes PRC, which is miles different from, for instance, the definition employed by the QUAD nations. Moreover, Indonesia’s ASEAN-first stance made the strategic value of the ASEAN nations skyrocket, as different ASEAN nations are pursued by different Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) programs. To explain, as of November 2023, Hoang Do assesses the current status of the relationship between different MDAs and ASEAN nations.
While the Indo-Pacific’s witnessing patchwork, ad-hoc MDA memberships and programs exactly lives up to its adherence to democratic and pluralistic principles, different MDAs do interfere with the effort to establish a definite and easy-to-maneuver common operating picture for all to access. Do explains, for instance, that the EU-backed CRIMARIO program, built to focus on critical maritime routes in the Indian Ocean, launched and perfected from 2015 to 2020, is extending its coverage to the Indo-Pacific. At its center lies the web-based platform called IORIS, collecting data from “Skylight AI” and the AIS. Furthermore, there seems, according to Do, a chance to integrate Copernicus satellite data and radio frequency data. Several ASEAN countries—Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—have the invition to adopt IORIS.
Without much of a surprise, the IORIS system clearly has interoperability issues with the IPMDA’s HawkEye360’s satellites and even information from unmanned aircraft systems in the future into the web-based SeaVision system developed by the US Department of Transportation. To make matters more complicated, IPMDA and CRIMARIO are not the only MDAs in the region. With Canada’s “Dark Vessel Detection Program,” Japan’s reliance on its MDA Situational Indication Linkages (MSIL), India’s notable Information Fusion Center-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), and the United Kingdom’s “Dialogue Partnership,” it is not difficult to assume the difficulty of combining all the aforesaid MDAs in terms of its objectives, targets, values, and data-processing, which, as mentioned again, should make the IPMDA stand out as the most reliable and precise system. However, the aforesaid challenges retard the creation of the grand common picture.
Recommendations
When Kurt Campbell, the Asia-Pacific Coordinator to the United States President, assumed his position in early 2021 with the inauguration of Joe Biden, his emphasis on encouraging the advent of different “ad-hoc” multilateral frameworks to seamlessly counter any revisionist and authoritarian advances and threats was an unprecedented move. The idea seemed logical and the world soon witnessed the birth of such security frameworks, such as the QUAD, the AUKUS, a meager but definite effort to revitalize the United Nations Command of Korea (composed of 15+ member states from the four corners), and many others. The aforesaid MDAs, serving rather as the bottleneck for the effective development of the IPMDA, however, demonstrate how the distinctive nature of such ad-hoc programs hinders our attempt to most effectively counter PRC’s perilous movements in the region. However, even such a bottleneck effect is in fact the expected side-effect of our utmost respect for democracy and pluralism, which our servicemen have pledged to defend at all costs.
Should the approach be a top-down one rather than a down-top approach? That is, in lieu of attempting to find technical countermeasures to seamlessly integrate, for instance, the IORIS system with the IFC-IOR, would it be possible to invite, for instance, Canada into the QUAD to force Canada to forgo its “Dark Vessel Detection Program” so that the program becomes a branch of the IPMDA?
However, since the QUAD cannot force, for instance, the EU to forgo its CRIMARIO initiative or change its objects and direction, the most apposite policy recommendation is to utilize the most diverse, most reliable mechanism in the Indo-Pacific so that the aforesaid programs, all distinct, come under one flag. While other MDAs and their data “languages” must have their own strengths, none boasts the interoperable experience already prevalent and proficient in India’s IFC-IOR. Like a mini North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the IFC-IOR already has fourteen liaison officers
–from Australia, Japan, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Singapore, United Kingdom, Italy, France, and US—being critical bridges between the IFC-IOR and their countries of origin while managing inputs into the common operating picture.
As a coherent maritime situation picture and acting as a maritime security information-sharing hub for friendly and partner countries with real-time plots and data, the IFC-IOR is also proficient at cooperating with similar data fusioning organizations, which is a critical factor in advocating the policy recommendation of utilizing the IFC-IOR as the linchpin of diverse data centers. The IFC-IOR also collects and disseminates incident reports, conducts trend analysis, and promotes best practices for maritime safety with the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar and other regional centres in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Dubai.
A rational follow-up question is also possible: if IFC-IOR shares data with other key fusion centers, what deters such centers from also being the potential linchpin? RMIFC, for instance, is more a West-Indian ocean entity, with most of its partners being African nations and some European nations. Its watertight relations with the commercial carrier industry is notable, with MAERSK and CMA CGM, for instance; however, they cannot be considered first responders to counter PRC moves in the Indo-Pacific due to the RMIFC’s regional focus and member nations’ lack of urgency against PRC’s assertiveness, let alone the QUAD nations only observer nations.
The IFC-Singapore comes in closer than the RMIFC. It is not only time-tested, but also has much relevance and things at stake against the backdrop of PRC aggressions in the region due to geographical proximity. Founded in 2009, the IFC-Singapore boasts, like the IFC-IOR, liaison officers from different nations, including the QUAD nations. Its strong focus on the commercial vessels is positive, in that the narrow straits of Singapore, Malay, and Taiwan, like mentioned above, are critical for the world economy, necessitating the FONOPs. However, the IFC-Singapore is not free of PRC influence. PRC liaison officers are situated in the IFC-Singapore, and while false accusations must be refrained, a concerted effort of the IPMDA, in the event of potential PRC aggressions and threats, can lose its might. The IFC-IOR, which, at this point, is completely free of PRC presence, clearly has the upper hand.
Some defend IFC-Singapore, citing that the U.S.-Singapore relations is more solid than that of PRC-Singapore. However, while Singapore may do all that is necessary to prevent espionage and information leaks to PRC agents in the IFC-Singapore, this does not deter the PRC agents from carrying out their missions, especially when they have motivation to protect their “little blue men.”
Conclusion
Coming back to the topic of the AIS, whose absence literally endangers the safety of maritime vessels in one of the most contest waters of the world, would corroborate why our member states’ common poise is important, which establishes why the IFC-IOR should be the dominant linchpin that integrates different centers across the Indo-Pacific until PRC’s irregular stance on the use of AIS and overall just common decency are fully restored.
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