Introduction

In October 2023, a report on 'Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity' released by the US Department of State stated that the US is entering a world of nuclear multipolarity with Russia and China.[1]

Central to this multipolarity equation is the rising nuclear threat posed by China against the US. This growing nuclear symmetry in the US and China relationship represents the possibility of a new arms race, as both countries are enhancing and diversifying their nuclear arsenal, delivery systems and deterrence strategies. The importance of the US-China bilateral relationship cannot be overstated in this context.

Under President Xi, China is rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities to assert itself as a great power. China’s current nuclear stockpile is expected to continue growing in the upcoming decades with an intention to meet parity with the US and Russia.

Once based on a policy of minimum deterrence, China's nuclear doctrine is evolving towards a more robust strategic posture, called a 'lean and effective' strategy that talks about deploying a sizeable amount of nuclear arsenal with sustained second-strike capabilities to deter any offensive [2].

To achieve this posture, China is making significant investments in its nuclear arsenal, developing new capabilities, and constructing new nuclear missile silos.[3] The 2022 National Defense Strategy of Biden Administration highlighted that “China remains the most consequential strategic competitor for the US in upcoming decades”.[4]

To counter China’s aggressive nuclear build-up, the US is upgrading its own posture and strengthening the existing capabilities of its nuclear triad. However, without bilateral strategic arms reduction measures between the US and China, the current nuclear landscape depicts fragility and a high possibility of 'strategic miscalculations' between both countries.

This issue brief analyses China's ongoing military modernisation efforts, focusing on its rapidly growing nuclear arsenal.

The paper further aims to highlight the US countermeasures against growing nuclear arms competition with China and what are the current prospect of bilateral strategic arms reduction measures between both nuclear powers.

China’s Nuclear modernisation plans and path towards Great Power Status

Historical Development of China's Nuclear Strategy

Since President Xi took office in 2013, he emphasised on the advancement of nuclear weapons and strengthening China’s overall deterrence capabilities. The 2019 Chinese Defence White Paper issued during his second term, outlined that “nuclear capabilities are the strategic cornerstone to safeguarding national sovereignty and security”.[5] Furthermore, President Xi’s remarks at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in October 2022, where he highlighted the importance of building strong strategic deterrence force system to enhance the ability of PLA to win war. [6]

President Xi views nuclear weapons as a 'strategic pillar of China's great power status', align with his goal to create a strong deterrent force by the middle of this century.[7]

As per the latest report on China’s military power released by US Department of Defense in December 2024, China is currently maintaining 600 operational nuclear warheads, projected to reach 1000 operational nuclear warheads by the end of 2030,  “comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it options at every rung of the escalation ladder”.[8]

The ongoing Chinese military modernisation efforts including nuclear build-up are closely tied with President Xi’s ambitions to ‘win and fight’ war against a strong enemy.[9] This focus comes at a time when China and US are facing strategic constraints in bilateral ties, primarily on Taiwan Strait.

For China, it is crucial to establish a robust deterrent system in response to US strong presence in East and South China seas.

The US currently operates its Pacific fleet in South China Sea and East China Sea in response to its ‘extended deterrence’ policy of nuclear umbrella with his allies. In response to the US nuclear presence near its shores, China is expanding its nuclear arsenal, and diversifying its delivery platforms, leading to a decrease in its nuclear threshold.  

Evolution of China's Nuclear Posture

Since China detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1964, China has consistently worked to enhance its overall deterrence architecture.

Under Chairman Mao Zedong, China began strengthening its deterrence by developing short range and mid-range ballistic missiles, a period often referred as ‘nuclear revolution’[10] in Chinese strategic circles.

The objectives of the Mao’s nuclear revolution were to build a minimum deterrence system against nuclear blackmail of great powers during the height of Cold-War.

Chairman Mao’s vision was continued by Chairman Deng Xiaoping, who publicly articulated the Chinese perspective on assured retaliation, if the other nuclear adversaries breach the nuclear threshold they have to face some retaliation. [11]

Under these two Chinese leaders, China’s strategic thinking regarding its nuclear arsenal and deterrence was majorly limited to deterring a larger enemy in a nuclear war and safeguarding Chinese territory and sovereignty.

However, Mao’s nuclear revolution and Xiaoping’s ‘assured retaliation’ laid the foundation for Chinese nuclear build-up and modernisation plans in the 21st century. The 1998 Chinese defence white paper advocated for the implementation of ‘Active Defense’ strategy to uphold China’s strategic position against adversaries.

This approach was encapsulated in the principle: “We will not attack, unless we are attacked; if we attacked, we will certainly counter-attack”. To strengthen  China’s deterrence capabilities in the line with the concept of ‘Active Defense’, the document also stressed the need for modernisation program of China’s national defense and building capabilities to fight future wars.[12]

Following the trend, in 2006, the Chinese government, for the first time, published its nuclear strategy in a White paper titled "China's National Defense in 2006”. It stated that China pursue a “self- defensive strategy” (ziwei fangyu he zhannlue).

The two principles of this strategy are “counter-attack in self-defense” (ziwei fanji) and the “limited development” (youxian fazhan) of nuclear arsenal.

Finally, China seeks “a lean and effective nuclear force” (jinggan youxia he lilian) to meet the requirements of “credible minimum deterrence” (zhanlue weishe zouyong).[13]

To achieve the objectives of credible minimum deterrence based on “ lean and effective posture”, the 2006 Chinese defense White Paper advocated for the three-step development of national defence by military modernisation plans and outlined the importance of robust strategic deterrence system based on multiple counter-strike capabilities. [14]

Concerns Over China’s "No First Use" Policy

China’s rapid advancement in its nuclear capabilities under a phased modernisation plan, raising concern about the future of its “No First Use” (NFU) policy, which is officially framed as self-imposed moratorium on its nuclear doctrine.

Despite this, questions remain about the level of ambiguity surrounding China’s nuclear strategy and its nuclear threshold. US strategists and scholars argues that China’s nuclear build-up contradict its declared policy of minimum deterrence and suggest that China may abandon its NFU stance, during a potential conflict over Taiwan.[15]

For deterring the Chinese nuclear threat, US is upgrading its own nuclear arsenal and brining new dimensions to its existing deterrence posture such as integrating the existing capabilities with new delivery platforms and building better Command and Control (C2C) systems.

Detering the Nuclear Adversary and Prospect of Bilateral Arms Measures

Concerns Over China’s "No First Use" Policy

The current Chinese leadership views nuclear weapons and their deterrent potential from the prism of power projection in strategic competition with the US. The 2017 National Security Strategy of President Trump acknowledged that “China and Russia challenge American power and attempting to erode American security and prosperity”.

It also acknowledged that “US advantages are shrinking as rival states modernise and build up their conventional and nuclear force”.[16] In response to the growing Chinese threat, the Trump Administration endorsed the idea of “preserve peace through strength”, focusing on rebuilding military and deterring adversaries across various domains, including layered air defense, space and cyberspace.[17]  

Additionally, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review of Trump Administration stressed upon “tailored deterrence” against Chinese nuclear and non-nuclear threat. The objectives of “tailored deterrence” is to strengthen the US deterrence capabilities, preventing a full-scale nuclear confrontation with China, and respond effectively to Chinese limited nuclear use if deterrence fails.[18]

The major shift in the US deterrence posture towards China occurred in the Biden administration's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and National Defense Strategy (NDS).

The 2022 National Defense Strategy of the Biden Administration explicitly identified China as the “most comprehensive and serious challenge to US national security”, and further argues that China’s coercive behaviour undermine US alliance and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.[19]

It highlighted the need to adjust the US strategic posture to counterbalance the Chinese nuclear modernisation efforts. In addition, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States submitted its final report, titled ‘America's Strategic Posture’, in October 2023, which provided a broad range of recommendations to the US strategic forces and Department of Defense.

These include strengthening the existing triad strategic delivery systems, maintain resilient nuclear force and sustain first-strike, and enhancing the credibility of the nuclear command and control (C2C) system.[20]

Instead of engaging in an open-ended nuclear arms race, the US and China have explored the possibility of bilateral strategic arms reduction initiatives under the first Trump and Biden Administrations.

Bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Measures

In November 2023, the US State Department hosted the first official China-US bilateral nuclear dialogue in almost five years.

The US delegation proposed measures to China aimed at reducing “strategic risks across multiple domains, including nuclear and outer space” and highlighted the need to promote stability by averting unconstrained arms race.[21]

However, China criticised the US deterrence policy and accused the US of trumping a fake "China nuclear threat" narrative.[22]

In absence of bilateral strategic arms reduction measures between the US and China, the risk of 'strategic miscalculation' remains high, potentially escalating a regional conflict into a more significant confrontation.

With the return of a “Trump 2.0” administration, there is a strong likelihood that the US will seek to engage with China diplomatically and militarily to reduce the perceived nuclear threat for escalation management.

At the diplomatic level, it is likely that under the new Trump Administration, the US may attempt to engage with China in bilateral strategic arms reduction measures, while on the military front, it will continue to modernise its strategic capabilities.

As argued by US strategists like Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller, former members of the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission in Foreign Affairs, “The new Trump Administration should limit itself to doing a quick update of the Biden guidance rather than a complete nuclear posture review”. [23]  

Under President Trump's 2.0 Administration, the US may prioritise addressing the challenges in its own deterrence posture to counter the Chinese nuclear threat: the slow pace of its modernisation plans, the large gap in conventional deterrence, and the integration of existing conventional forces with strategic nuclear forces.

It is also crucial for the new administration to uphold the credibility and reliability of US extended deterrence in the region in response to Chinese nuclear build-up, in order to prevent a regional nuclear arms race.

Conclusion

The current global nuclear order is evolving from Cold War-era nuclear bipolarity to a state of nuclear tri-polarity, driven by military modernisation plans of the US and China, particularly about their nuclear arsenal.

The focus on nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of their respective strategic posture underscores the importance of nuclear arsenal in the emerging great power competition between both the nuclear-armed nations.

The US and China are deeply interested in bringing new technological advancements in their strategic arsenals, based on developing new delivery systems for better retaliatory measures and enhancing their strategic command forces' centralised command and control structures.

The challenge for the US lies in countering China’s nuclear capabilities while ensuring its strategic deterrence posture remains solid and diversified.

Meanwhile, China's rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal, driven by strategic considerations and aspirations to become a 'great power', further complicates the emerging dyad relationship with the US.

Both countries believe the nuclear threshold should not be breached in terms of wartime escalation that can result in an all-out nuclear war.

Following the footsteps of the previous White House Administration, there's a likelihood that the new Trump administration may seek to engage with China to reduce escalatory tensions.

However, from the Chinese side, there's less possibility under President Xi China would prefer to engage with the new Trump administration on strategic stability because it will derail China's ongoing nuclear buildup plans.

The US and China need to adopt a comprehensive bilateral framework approach based on robust strategic communication channels and confidence-building measures to mitigate the conflict escalation that can lead to all-out nuclear war.

[1] Department of State, ‘ Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity’, October 2023, p.1, available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ISAB-Report-on-Deterrence-in-a-World-of-Nuclear-Multipolarity_Final-Accessible.pdf  

[2] China's 'Lean and Effective' nuclear strategy talks about adhering to an active defence posture by developing robust second-strike capabilities while keeping the low alert readiness of diversified warheads and delivery platforms under the obligation of the declared 'No First Use' policy in 1964. M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton University Press 2019), pp. 243-247.

[3] Kristensen, M. Hans & Korda, Matt, “ China’s nuclear missile silo expansion: From minimum deterrence to medium deterrence”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2021, available at https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/chinas-nuclear-missile-silo-expansion-from-minimum-deterrence-to-medium-deterrence/

[4] US Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy”, October 27, 2022, p. 4, available at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf

[5] The English translation of the 2019 Chinese Defense White Paper, China’s National Defense in a New Era, p. 13, available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/whitepaperonnationaldefenseinnewera.doc

[6] Full text of the report to the 20th National congress of the Communist Party of China, available at https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/tjzl/cpcjj/20thPartyCongrssReport/

[7] Remarks by President Xi on the Founding Ceremony of Rocket Force Strategic Support Force, January 2, 2016, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0102/c64094-28003839.html

[8] US Department of Defense, “ Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024”, December 18, 2024, p. 101, available at https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF

[9] PTI, “Chinese military’s new focus: winning wars against strong enemies, opponents”, August 24, 2024, https://www.deccanherald.com/world/chinese-militarys-new-focus-winning-wars-against-strong-enemies-opponents-3163245

[10] Shu, Guang Zhang, 'Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers’: Mao's View of Nuclear Weapons', in John Gaddis, and others (eds), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 (Oxford, 1999; onlineedn, Oxford Academic, November 16 2004), pp. 194-215, available at https://doi.org/10.1093/0198294689.003.0009, accessed on November 24, 2024.

[11] Xiaoping, Deng, “Deng Xiaoping’s Selected Discourses on Military Buildup in the New Period”, (Beijing Bayi Press, 1993), p.72

[12] Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, July 1998, Beijing, available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.2.htm

[13] Fravel, M. Taylor, “Securing Borders China’s Doctrine and Force Structure for Frontier Defense”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, August 2007, p. 707, available at https://web.mit.edu/fravel/www/fravel.2007.JSS.securing.borders.pdf , accessed on December 2, 2024.

[14] Government White Paper: China’s National Defense in 2006: information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, December 2006, Beijing, Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2007, Pp 195-235, available on https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmm007, accessed on November 28, 2024.

[15] Cunnigham, Fionna and Fravel. M, David, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and US-China Strategic Stability”, International Security, Vol.40.2 (Fall 2015), pp. 32-35, .available on https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/40/2/7/12274/Assuring-Assured-Retaliation-China-s-Nuclear?redirectedFrom=fulltext

[16] White House Archives, “National Security Strategy of the United States”, December 2017, pp.2-3, available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

[17] White House Archives, “National Security Strategy of the United States”, December 2017, p. 4, available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

[18] Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review”, February 2018, pp. 31-32, available at https://media.defense.gov/2018/feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-nuclear-posture-review-final-report.pdf

[19] US Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy”, October 27, 2022, p. 4, available at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf

[20] America’s Strategic Posture, ‘The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States’, October 2023, pp. 96-97, Full text available on https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic-posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx

[21] Office of the Spokesperson, “ Assistant Secretary Mallory Stewarts’s Meeting with the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director-General of Arms Control Sun Xiaobo”, November 7, 2023, available at https://www.state.gov/assistant-secretary-mallory-stewarts-meeting-with-the-peoples-republic-of-chinas-prc-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-director-general-of-arms-control-sun-xiaobo/

[22] Weichao, Li, “Remarks of Ministry of National Defense”, August 29, 2024, available at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16334390.html

[23] Creedon, Madelyn and Miller, Franklin, ‘Deterring the Nuclear Dictators’, Foreign Affairs, November 20, 2024, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/deterring-nuclear-dictators