About the Author

Cadet Brandon Tran is Non-Resident Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center and a student at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is an International Affairs and Chinese double major. He has worked extensively on issues relating to China and Indo-Pacific security studies with various US government entities and think-tanks. He has also published several articles in The Diplomat, Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, and the Irregular Warfare Initiative, with more articles pending publication.  He hopes to commission as a military intelligence officer.

The views expressed are the author’s own, and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Introduction

With the current geopolitical environment, talk of the People’s Republic of China dominates news headlines, and ubiquitous reports of aggressive activity by the People’s Liberation Army have become part of daily life.  The circumstances surrounding China’s rise to prominence, and its potential to rival the United States and overturn the status quo are the subject of extreme scrutiny by all.  A problematic aspect of this fervor is that there are no small number of misconceptions surrounding the PRC, and in particular, the PLA with its capabilities and intentions.  Nowhere are these misconceptions more obvious than in news reporting.  On any given day, one can find analysts lampooning the PRC’s corruption and incompetence, prophesizing internal combustion while others still emphasize the rapid expansion of Chinese power, forecasting inevitable invasions and doom.[i]  The truth is somewhere in between.

 Regardless of one’s intentions on dealing with the PRC, whether it be cooperation or outright confrontation, an accurate appraisal of the other side is necessary to yield positive outcomes.  This is especially prescient in the Indo-Pacific security environment, characterized by a great-power competition made complicated by the involvement of many smaller states.  A proper understanding of the PLA is required in order to manage tensions and the myriad of disputes in the region.  The PLA is not a grossly incompetent dumpster fire, nor is it the invincible juggernaut that popular opinion paints it out to be.  Like all organizations, it is a product of its circumstances, a series of compromises necessary to sustain all its patrons and stakeholders, in this case, the Chinese Communist Party.  In order to see the real PLA, it must be understood that the organization is self-aware, that it grows and develops with tradeoffs in mind, and that the actions it currently pursues is a reflection of its history and present circumstances. 

 A Self-Aware People’s Liberation Army

“Historical experience tells us that countries that embrace the sea thrive, while states that spurn the sea decline.”

 -Xi Jinping, July 30, 2013, speech to the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee

 A particularly erroneous and dangerous assumption made about the PLA is that it is an entity that lacks self-awareness, owing to the nature of the dissent suppressing regime it is attached to.  This cannot be farther from the truth, and despite the PLA’s comparatively limited combat experience when compared to the leading militaries of the present, there are no shortage of analysts on the Chinese side who have presented actionable and effective measures to improve the PLA.  Nor is the PLA itself, neglectful of the advice that it is presented.  Examining the PLA’s execution and reflection of operations in the littoral island campaigns of 1949-1950, the Taiwan Strait Crises, and the Sino-Vietnamese War will quickly dispel the idea of a willfully ignorant adversary, and instead present the image of a military that has had to grow up and develop in a peculiar political environment that presents unique challenges. 

 Analysis of the 1949-1950 littoral island campaigns that facilitated the displacement of the Nationalist Army from the Chinese mainland present the original lessons that the PLA have to work with in regard to multi-domain operations and guidelines for forcibly reunifying with Taiwan.  While the PLA had handily won its battles against the Nationalists up to this point, the PLA is now confronted with the necessity to build a navy practically from scratch as their campaigns have now progressed beyond the most basic riverine operations.  The prevailing assumption in Western scholarship on the PLA Navy is that the PLA only really began considering naval problems in the 1980s, and unquestioningly took on Soviet naval doctrine.  Chinese sources on the 1949-1950 littoral campaigns prove otherwise.[ii]

 In order to create a completely new armed service, Mao Zedong’s officers had to undergo a shift in perspective, as the PLA up to this point has been a ground fighting force, and many of its personnel have never even seen the ocean.[iii]  In constructing the PLAN, cadres discovered that the skills, attitudes, and expertise that were effective on land, had to be reevaluated for nautical operations.  Notably, PLAN planners found themselves having to rely on Nationalist defectors for expertise, needing to compromise the ideological purity that was the core of the PLA’s fighting philosophy and organization in order to achieve practical results on the battlefield.[iv]  The PLAN’s formation is a story of tradeoffs, and as time passed, the navy bears the marks of its hybrid influences. 

       Following their riverine victories on the mainland in 1949, the PLA Army and PLA Navy embarked on operations to take offshore islands from the Nationalists.  Beginning with Xiamen, the Communist forces swiftly defeated the defenders on the island and made preparations to besiege Jinmen.  However, the Xiamen campaign contained underlying issues that the PLA had still not reconciled when planning for amphibious assaults.[v]  In the planning phase to take Jinmen, the PLA’s military intelligence units were only able to field shaky estimates, and the estimates that were provided were ignored out of excessive optimism.  As a result, the PLA was dealt a significant and conclusive defeat at Jinmen as the Jinmen garrison outnumbered the Communist attacking force by a 3 to 1 ratio.[vi]  The PLA would also suffer heavy casualties in the subsequent campaign to take Zhoushan, with intelligence failing to consider the possibility of reinforcements to Zhoushan from nearby islands.[vii]  In the aftermath of these setbacks, Mao Zedong exercised increased control over the PLA and ardently advised his commanders to recall the oversights that surrounded Jinmen and Zhoushan.  With these lessons in mind, the PLA embarked on its first large-scale amphibious operation and its first joint army-navy operation, capturing Hainan and Wanshan respectively, and dealing heavy blows to the Nationalists.  In these operations, the PLA learned from its mistakes, fielding extensive intelligence networks for these campaigns to gather meteorological data and information on Nationalist troop movements.  In the Hainan campaign in particular, the PLA was also able to integrate guerilla units to with their operations in order to gather intelligence and engage in combat, drawing on its traditional strengths in unconventional warfare.[viii]  The PLA’s capture of the Yijiangshan Islands in the 1955 First Taiwan Strait Crisis demonstrated that it learned its lessons well, but failures to take Jinmen and Matsu in the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis as well as difficulties in wresting the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974 indicated that there was still room for improvement.  These improvements took the form of establishing the PLAN Marine Corps and the massive expansion of Chinese naval assets throughout the decades, along with regular amphibious assault exercises.[ix] 

 On land, the lackluster performance of the PLA against neighboring Vietnam in 1979 also presented moments for introspection for Chinese leaders, namely that ideology and force of will alone are insufficient substitutes for technological power and combat proficiency.  The extensive network of commissars and cadres were insufficient in enabling the PLA’s troops to overcome poor tactics, operations, and strategy from their commanders.[x]  Political work came before all else, including actual training, and the results proved disastrous as human waves were repeatedly and bloodily turned back.  Following the misadventures in Vietnam, Deng Xiaoping would emphasize the importance of quality training and education for the PLA and political work was reduced in status, albeit not completely removed so that the CCP could still maintain its hold over the military.[xi] 

 The PLA is not a construction of afterthoughts, but rather carefully organized with compromises and support from many sources in order to confront the very particular set of challenges that the PLA faces with regards to its enemies and its own structural composition.  Like all organizations, its present form is a reflection of the tradeoffs necessary to fulfill its intended function.  This does not mean that Chinese officials are not aware of the deficiencies that such tradeoffs create, and to assume that the PLA is not self-aware is at the very least, profoundly dangerous.  At present, Chinese military leaders have no illusions about the current readiness and capabilities of the PLA, noting that it suffers extensively from corruption and a lack of proficiency.[xii]  Effectively countering the PLA requires careful study of what weaknesses exist, how long they will persist before being rectified, and how to exploit them. 

  Tradeoffs Between Ideology and Technology, Loyalty and Competence

“History tells us that reform and innovation are a broad road for the continuous development of the people's army. The strength of the people's army comes from reform and innovation. The victory of the people's army comes from reform and innovation.”

 -Xi Jinping, August 1, 2017, speech for the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA

 Nowhere are conscious tradeoffs in the PLA more apparent than in personnel selections and purges for leadership roles within the Central Military Commission and the services of the People’s Liberation Army.  The expulsion of former Chinese defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on June 27, 2024, was only the latest development in a saga of purges in the PLA ostensibly aimed at rooting out corruption.[xiii]  President Xi Jinping’s continuous pursuit of reforms to shape the PLA into a “world-class military” capable of achieving the PRC’s national security objectives illustrate an underlying tension that stems from competing priorities.[xiv] Since the PLA is the armed component of the CCP, Xi Jinping must make tradeoffs in balancing regime loyalty and military competence when selecting PLA officers for senior positions.[xv]  Officers that are promoted must be technically adept and sufficiently innovative while also inflexibly holding Xi’s version of the party ideology close.  Examining those who Xi Jinping fired within the last year and their replacements illustrate this trend.  Capping off years of military reform since 2015, these purges largely targeted senior leaders in more technical roles and services such as those pertaining to aerospace, logistics, and cyberspace, despite previously investing heavily into those capabilities for the PLA. 

 The purges started following the resignation of former People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force commander Wei Fenghe from his position as the PRC’s Minister of Defense in March of 2023.[xvi]  He was succeeded Li Shangfu, who has close ties to the PLARF, being an aerospace engineer by trade.[xvii]  As the probes continued in June of 2023, PLARF commander Li Yuchao, PLARF Commissar Xu Zhongbo, and PLARF deputy commander Liu Guangbin and former PLARF deputy commander Zhang Zhenzhong all disappeared without official cause given.  Nonetheless, there was speculation that these officers engaged in espionage and embezzlement.[xviii]  As well, in the following month, another former deputy of the PLARF Wu Guohua died under mysterious circumstances.  Official reports rule Wu’s death as due to illness, but a former associate of his posits that certain pressures from his work drove him to suicide.[xix]

 The investigations would expand beyond the PLARF, concerned about the loyalty of the PLA as a whole.  In July of 2023, Ju Qiansheng, commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force went missing amid investigations of misconduct, and around this time, Shang Hong, head of the space systems department serving under Ju resigned from his position and had not been heard from since.[xx]  In April of 2024, the PLASSF was dissolved and its three component branches, the Aerospace Force, the Cyberspace Force, and the Information Support Force were all made into individual services.  These services would be subordinated directly to the CMC and are now easier to control.[xxi]  In September, Cheng Dongfang, head of the PLA Military Court and the defense minister Li Shangfu disappeared without a trace mere months after their promotions.[xxii]  Li Shangfu was previously the deputy commander of the Strategic Support Force and head of the Equipment Development Department.  After months of speculation, it is now known that both Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu have been ousted from the CCP on charges of corruption and implications of disloyalty.[xxiii]

 Following these developments, in December of 2023, the National People's Congress announced the removal of 9 senior military officials from their positions.[xxiv]  Li Yuchao and Zhang Zhenzhong were now officially expelled.  Former PLARF commander Zhou Yaning, head of the PLARF armaments department Lu Hong, and former PLARF deputy Li Chuanguang were all dismissed and Commander of the Southern Theater Navy Ju Xinchun and PLAAF commander Ding Laihang were removed from their positions.  Of particular note is the firing of Equipment Development Department officials Zhang Yulin and Rao Wenmin, as there is reason to suspect that they had a hand in the misconduct that also entangled Li Shangfu.[xxv]

 Of noe is that Xi Jinping’s selections for promotion are just as interesting as the ousted ministers themselves.  Li Yuchao and Xu Zhongbo were replaced by Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng respectively.  Wang was the deputy commander for the PLAN and has a reputation for strict obedience, while Xu Xisheng was previously a PLAAF commissar assigned to the strategically important Southern Theater Command.  Neither have had technical experience relating to aerospace assets and rockets, making Xi’s preference for loyalty evident in their selection.[xxvi]  The appointment of the PLAN commander Dong Jun to replace Li Shangfu the new defense minister, however, would buck this pattern.  Dong Jun’s promotion is a reflection of his own competence and the skills that he brings to the table, however Xi has also taken pains to handicap him.   

 Dong Jun previously served as the deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, responsible for Taiwan Strait maritime issues and disputed islands in the East China Sea. After that, Dong was deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command, which oversees operations in the contested South China Sea.  He has extensive operational experience in these strategically vital theater commands handling China’s most salient national security interests and practice conducting gray zone activities because such operations are largely carried out by the PLA Navy and conducted in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands’ areas of responsibility.  Dong Jun is also not sanctioned by the United States, unlike his predecessor, which has enabled him to serve the PRC in a military diplomacy role.[xxvii]  With that being said, Dong Jun has still not been appointed to the Central Military Commission, unlike the previous Ministers of Defense, implying that for all of Dong’s abilities, Xi still does not trust him fully, and needed a pragmatic compromise for his military reforms.[xxviii] 

 Xi Jinping’s 2022 selections for the Central Military Commission also highlight his careful balancing act of tradeoffs.  In order of rank, they are Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu (who has since been removed), Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin. Xi’s appointments of these senior leaders to the CMC indicate an attempt to balance loyalty and experience because many of his selections break precedent.[xxix] For instance, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were both promoted despite Zhang being past retirement age and Liu being the youngest in his rank group. These exceptions were made considering both Zhang and Liu have combat experience from the Sino-Vietnamese border wars, a rare and valuable commodity in the largely untested and inexperienced PLA.  In other unconventional moves, He Weidong was permitted to skip key career milestones before assuming his position on the CMC. At the same time, Miao Hua transitioned from a long Army career to become the Navy’s political commissar. Indeed, selection to senior leadership positions was also based on personal connections and previous experience with Xi.  He Weidong and Miao Hua previously collaborated with Xi back when he was a Fujian provincial official, and both Zhangs hail from the same region as Xi, claiming membership in his influential Shaanxi Gang.[xxx]  Xi Jinping’s selections indicate that he spares no expense in elevating commanders who he personally knows to be capable and loyal to him, but in the end, his approach remains imperfect given the scandal that surrounded Li Shangfu.

 Xi’s CMC appointments also highlight another result that tradeoffs have on the PLA, more than just compromising on competence for loyalty, and vice versa.  The PLA has consistently suffered from a pernicious “Big Army Mentality” that constitutes an impediment to the formation of a capable modern joint force.[xxxi]  While in recent years the PLA has made significant progress on developing their capabilities in many warfighting areas, especially the more technical and unconventional domains of war, they have had profound difficulty creating synergy among the services.  In particular, they have had difficulties developing their Navy and Air Force’s capabilities and integrating officers from these branches.[xxxii]  The Ground Force, with its long proud history dating back to the beginning of the Chinese Civil War, has always been seen as the bastion for party loyalty in the PLA, and so the vast majority of the PLA leadership is drawn from its ranks.  Contrast this with the PLA Navy for instance, whose formation owes a large part to captured Nationalist Navy officers and whose influence on the PLAN persists to this day.[xxxiii]

 Indeed, while the reorganization of the PLA into brigade formations and theater commands have enabled smoother function and greater unity of command, an overwhelming number of theater commanders and political commissars hail from the PLAGF.   Of the 5 members of the CMC, 3 of these officials are PLA Ground Force officers, 1 is a Navy officer, and 1 is a Rocket Force officer, with no Air Force representation in the CMC. Even then, Miao Hua the Navy officer was originally an Army officer.[xxxiv] Also of note is the fact that, as recently as 2022, there was currently only one Air Force and one Navy officer serving as a theater commander and theater command commissar respectively, and only one Navy and Rocket Force officer serving as a theater command chief of staff.[xxxv] 

 The readiness issues that these conscious tradeoffs have created are clear.  Even the services that the PRC granted significant investment have had difficulties in synchronizing with the rest of the PLA, and in maintaining combat capability on their own end.  The vaunted Rocket Force has been found to be lacking in staffing and adequate equipment, a far cry from being an air defense artillery service that can provide effective fire support in support of the main three services.[xxxvi]  For all its technology and extensive responsibilities, it is wasn’t clear how the now defunct Strategic Support Force would have been able to coordinate with the theater commands to provide maneuver support assets.[xxxvii]  The PRC even admits that the PLA is far from its ideal of a modern military force following the results of exercises at Zhurihe and beyond.[xxxviii]  After-actions reports note that the PLA is far from its ideal of a modern military force, noting a significant obstacles to creating a joint force, in particular, the inability for officers to competently and flexibility address issues that may arise in a combat scenario.  Xi’s military modernization, while it has bequeathed the PLA with a wide variety of potent weapon systems, has also simultaneously ejected the personnel capable of wielding them effectively.   

 Guiding Principles

“During the progress of hostilities, guerillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army… There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.”

 –On Guerilla Warfare, by Mao Zedong

 To put Xi’s priorities and the PLA’s various military operations into context, it is vital to understand the foundational principles of the PLA’s military philosophy. Since its inception, the PRC has espoused a warfighting philosophy called Active Defense. According to this perspective, conflict is believed to exist on a spectrum ranging from peace to kinetic war.[xxxix] As a result, the PLA assumes a proactive force posture, constantly assessing potential threats and carrying out activities below the threshold of kinetic war that could create a better geopolitical position for the PRC. Through Active Defense, the PLA would theoretically be able to accomplish its objectives while controlling escalation on the conflict continuum.  The United States and other Western militaries conceive of operational planning through what is known as a course of action.  This concept focuses on an objective and what schemes friendly forces can take to achieve this end.  On the other hand, PLA planners utilize stratagems to achieve their ends, which is enemy focused.  They are preoccupied with the enemy’s present state, and the PLA’s desired end state for the enemy to be in, and so therefore target any and all efforts to coercing this end state.[xl]  An example to explain this idea can be derived from the difference between the US and Chinese doctrinal concepts of “deterrence.”[xli]  For the United States and much of the West, deterrence is like a sleeping porcupine.  Its capacity for harm is apparent, and so long as one does not disturb the porcupine, then there will be no harm.  The Chinese equivalent of deterrence, weishe (威懾), carries an additional connotation of coercion.  Imagine the same porcupine, but instead of sleeping, it is cantankerous and makes aggressive feints towards you with regularity.  These moves are designed to make the PLA’s potential adversaries reactive and imbalanced, taking away initiative and placing it within the grasp of the PLA.

 In tandem with Active Defense is the concept of People’s War, incorporating lessons from the past century and a half and forming the backbone of the PLA’s tactics and strategies. From its inception by Mao during the Chinese Civil War to the present day, the idea of People’s War has gone through several revisions, but the crux remains the same.[xlii] Warfighting proficiency must be pursued through all possible means at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The United States understands this in the modern context as being able to field a proficient joint force capable of combined arms and multi-domain operations.

 However, due to having to include party loyalty as a prerequisite for promotion, the PLA suffers from the acute “Big Army Mentality” that prevents the realization of an effective joint force.  Because of the pervasive favoritism towards the dominance of ground forces, the PLA has consistently struggled to integrate the other services, preventing it from proficiently executing multi-domain operations in both war and peacetime. Wargames and exercises conducted by Chinese military leaders have demonstrated that the PLA is still not ready to face near-peer adversaries in conventional warfare. PLA reflections frequently acknowledge these shortcomings, citing slogans like the “Five Incapables,” “Two Incompatibles,” and “Three Whethers” to illustrate problems of rigidity, lack of proficiency, and general lack of readiness.[xliii]

 As a result of these weaknesses, and despite the PLA’s rapid modernization, the PLA still favors asymmetrical approaches. This attitude is best explained by the Chinese military concept of shi (勢), rendered in English as a “strategic configuration of power.” Under this framework, one’s military assets are arrayed to create an advantageous situation and physical power is applied at that particular moment to achieve victory.[xliv]  Returning to Active Defense and People’s War, shi (勢), when applied, would craft an unassailable position for the PLA and enable it to maximize its resources if conflict escalates to kinetic war.  The best way to describe this mindset is that the PLA exists in a perpetual state of contention.  While Western militaries remain vigilant for threats, they are largely reactive entities that will switch between wartime and peacetime postures.  The PLA is akin to a scale.  There is no end to attempting to achieve a competitive advantage and there is no end to shaping the future battlefield.  To this end, the PLA employs irregular tactics to create favorable geopolitical and battlefield conditions to achieve this objective, maximizing China’s strengths and neutralizing enemy advantages before conflict begins.  Should the PLA sufficiently develop its conventional military capabilities via technology and human capital, then the PLA will start pivoting away from irregular warfare and towards large-scale combat operations.[xlv]

 Conclusion

The People’s Liberation Army is not a paper tiger, nor is it a looming boogeyman.  It is an organization with an agenda and mission set to fulfill with constraints imposed upon it.  It poses a credible and viable threat to its potential adversaries, but there are no foregone conclusions on the outcomes of its operations.  Understanding this is critical to forming an unbiased appraisal of PRC military capabilities, preventing excessive overconfidence or hysteria when faced with the task of having to contend against the PLA. 

 That said, the contention with the PLA appears to be a pressing issue that is increasingly difficult to ignore for the US and its allies.  With the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping restated his vowed to reunify Taiwan with the mainland.  He had already set a goal to be militarily ready to take Taiwan by 2027, a goal to counterbalance any military by 2035, and a goal to become a “world-class” military power by 2049.[xlvi]  These are the assumptions and operational time frames that the US and its allies have to work with.  The PRC appraises that the PLA is still lagging behind the US military.  There is still time to exploit and widen the gap, but only if an accurate picture of the challenge and threat is conceived. 

 __________________________________________

 [i]There is no shortage of news articles, particularly from mainstream media outlets who sensationalize news coming out of China to paint a narrative of a floundering dictatorship or an insurmountable superpower.  News feeds have a tendency to distribute these kinds of articles. 

Xie Tao, “ Why Do People Keep Predicting China’s Collapse?” The Diplomat, March 20, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-do-people-keep-predicting-chinas-collapse/; “Fear of a Soviet-style collapse keeps Xi Jinping up at night,” The Economist, September 30, 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/09/30/fear-of-a-soviet-style-collapse-keeps-xi-jinping-up-at-night; Noah Robertson, “How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/05/07/how-dc-became-obsessed-with-a-potential-2027-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan/#:~:text=Some%20in%20defense%20circles%20say%20the; Dennis Unkovic, “Is China Invincible?” Pittsburgh Quarterly, August 7, 2024, https://pittsburghquarterly.com/articles/is-china-invincible/#:~:text=Many%20in%20the%20West%20are%20convinced.

[ii]Toshi Yoshihara, Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, (Georgetown University Press: January 2023), 11-12.

[iii]Ibid., 1-2.

[iv]Ibid., 23, 35-39.

[v]Ibid., 68-72.

[vi]Ibid., 73-74.

[vii]Ibid., 84-85.

[viii]Ibid., 92-96, 104.

[ix]Xiaobing Li, “PLA Amphibious Campaigns and the Origins of the Joint Island Landing Campaign,” in On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of War, Vol. 2, ed. Timothy Heck, B. A. Friedman, and Walker D. Mills (Marine Corps University Press, 2024),  228-246; Edward Salo, “Not a Carbon Copy of the U.S. Marine Corps,” in On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of War, Vol. 2, ed. Timothy Heck, B. A. Friedman, and Walker D. Mills (Marine Corps University Press, 2024), 321-324.

[x]Edward C. O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War, (Routledge: 2007), 150-155.

[xi]Ibid., 162-166.

[xii]U.S. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the

People’s Republic of China: 2023,” Annual Report to Congress, 2023, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF, 42-43, 177-178.

[xiii]“China expels 2 former defense ministers from its ruling Communist Party over graft allegations,” AP News, June 27, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/china-li-shangfu-defense-minister-expelled-communist-party-5bc8bf0f8ebc89b9db02a06b511e5a42.

[xiv]Edmund J. Burke, Kristen Gunness, Cortez A. Cooper III, and Mark Cozad, “People's Liberation Army Operational Concepts.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA394-1.html.

[xv]Lindsay Maizland and Eleanor Albert, “Backgrounder: The Chinese Communist Party,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 6, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party.

[xvi]王允, 《李尚福久未露面　外界质疑中国极权体制》, Radio Free Asia, September 12, 2023, https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/zhengzhi/wy2-09122023115437.html/ampRFA.

[xvii]Marcus Clay, “Who Is Li Shangfu, China’s Next Defense Minister?” The Diplomat, February 27, 2023,  https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/who-is-li-shangfu-chinas-next-defense-minister/.

[xviii]Joyce Huang, “Analysts Say Shakeup at China’s Rocket Force Suggests Strategy Shift Toward ‘Nuclear Triad,’” Voice of America, August 2, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/analysts-say-shakeup-at-china-s-rocket-force-suggests-strategy-shift-toward-nuclear-triad-/7208792.html.

[xix]Jeffrey Pao, “China replaces rocket force head amid graft probe,” Asia Times, August 2, 2023, https://asiatimes.com/2023/08/china-replaces-rocket-force-head-amid-graft-probe/.

[xx]《解放军战略支援部队司令巨乾生上将缺席建军96周年招待会》, 聯合早報, August 3, 2023, https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20230803-1420298;  《韓詠紅：中國軍隊深度整頓中》, 聯合早報, September 29, 2023, https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20230929-1437833.

[xxi]J. Michael Dahm, “A Disturbance in the Force: The Reorganization of People’s Liberation Army Command and Elimination of China’s Strategic Support Force,” China Brief Vol. 24, no. 9, April 26, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/a-disturbance-in-the-force-the-reorganization-of-peoples-liberation-army-command-and-elimination-of-chinas-strategic-support-force/#:~:text=The%20April%202024%20reorganization%20eliminated%20the. 

[xxii]“The disappearance of China’s defence minister raises big questions,” The Economist, September 20, 2023, https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/20/the-disappearance-of-chinas-defence-minister-raises-big-questions. 

[xxiii]William Zheng, “Was fallen Chinese defence minister Wei Fenghe compromised by hostile force?” South China Morning Post,” July 10, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3269799/official-indictment-fallen-chinese-defence-minister-wei-fenghe-may-include-coded-hint-he-was. 

[xxiv]《（受权发布）全国人民代表大会常务委员会公告〔十四届〕第二号》, 新华网, December 19, 2023, https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20231229A0ABJ800.

[xxv]《九名中國軍方人大代表被免職　分析：火箭軍和裝備系統腐敗窩案波及廣泛》, 聯合早報, December 30, 2023, https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20231230-1459005.

[xxvi]Brad Lendon, Simone McCarthy and Wayne Chang, “China replaces elite nuclear leadership in surprise military shake-up,” CNN, August 2, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/02/china/china-pla-rocket-force-shakeup-new-leaders-intl-hnk-ml-mic/index.html#:~:text=On%20Monday,%20state%20media%20named%20Wang.

[xxvii]Yew Lun Tian and Laurie Chen, “Chinese ex-Navy chief, with South China Sea background, named defence minister,” Reuters, December 29, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-appoints-dong-jun-new-defence-minister-state-media-2023-12-29/#:~:text=China%20named%20former%20Navy%20chief%20Dong. 

[xxviii]Shanshan Mei, “Did China Just Demote Its Defense Ministry?” RAND, August 14, 2024,  https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/08/did-china-just-demote-its-defense-ministry.html#:~:text=Among%20the%20most%20significant%20personnel%20changes.

[xxix]Brian Waidelich, “China’s New Military Leadership: Possible Strengths and Weaknesses,” Center for Naval Analyses, November 11, 2022, https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2022/11/chinas-new-miliatry-leadership-possible-strengths-and-weaknesses.

[xxx]Lyle J. Morris, “What China’s New Central Military Commission Tells Us About Xi’s Military Strategy,” Asia Society Policy Institute, October 27, 2022, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/what-chinas-new-central-military-commission-tells-us-about-xis-military-strategy. 

[xxxi]Brian Waidelich, “China’s New Military Leadership: Possible Strengths and Weaknesses.”

[xxxii]Caitlin Campbell, “China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46808, 45-46.

[xxxiii]Toshi Yoshihara, Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, 23.

[xxxiv]Brian Waidelich, “China’s New Military Leadership: Possible Strengths and Weaknesses.”

[xxxv]《中国人民解放军战区》,  百度百科, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E6%88%B0%E5%8D%80/19330578#reference-3.

[xxxvi]“China's military rocket force uncovers 'shortcomings,' PLA Daily reports,” Reuters, September 15, 2023,  https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-military-rocket-force-uncovers-shortcomings-pla-daily-2023-09-15/#:~:text=A%20unit%20of%20China's%20Rocket%20Force; Justin Ong, “The US reportedly believes China fills missiles with water instead of fuel. Is that plausible?” Channel News Asia, January 11, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/china-missiles-water-fuel-cna-explains-us-intelligence-corruption-pla-4040281#:~:text=11%20Jan%202024%2004:39PM.%20SINGAPORE:%20Missiles; Brandon Tran, “The Shakeup in China’s Rocket Force Continues,” The Diplomat, January 3, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/the-shakeup-in-chinas-rocket-force-continues/.

[xxxvii]Cristina L. Garafola, “People's Liberation Army Reforms and Their Ramifications,” RAND, September 23, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2016/09/pla-reforms-and-their-ramifications.html.

[xxxviii]Don Tse, “China’s Americanized Military,” The Diplomat, December 13, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/chinas-americanized-military/. 

[xxxix]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “ATP 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics,” Department of the Army, August 9, 2021, https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/us-army-chinese-tactics-2021.pdf, (1-5), (1-7 - 1-10).

[xl]Ibid., (1-13).

[xli]Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Derek Grossman, Kristen Gunness, Michael S. Chase, Marigold Black, and Natalia D. Simmons-Thomas, “Deciphering Chinese Deterrence Signalling in the New Era: An Analytic Framework and Seven Case Studies” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1074-1.html.   

[xlii]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “ATP 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics,” (1-8 - 1-12).

[xliii]U.S. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the

People’s Republic of China: 2023,” 177-178.

[xliv]David Lai, “Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi,” US Army War College Press, 2004, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/771. 

[xlv]Brandon Tran, “Beijing’s Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, July 25, 2024, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/beijings-long-game-gray-zone-tactics-in-the-pacific/. 

[xlvi]U.S. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the

People’s Republic of China: 2023,” 34-35.