The 19th Hangzhou Asian Games, held in China’s Zhejiang province was way more than a simple sports event. It was not just the biggest international sports event held in China since the end of its Zero COVID policy, but in the words of official media, was a glimpse of “the bright future of Chinese-style modernisation”, a “dialogue of diverse Asian civilisations”, an “essence of Chinese taste” as well as the “continuity of cultural genes”. Being the first and the biggest international event to be held in China after the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in October 2022, the event stands as a microcosm of  the political and ideological developments that have characterised China’s trajectory since the arrival of Xi Jinping.

 Background

If the 2008 Beijing Olympics were a “coming-out party for an emergent China—rich, influential, technologically advanced, and, most of all, more and more open to the outside[i]”,  the 19th Hangzhou Asian Games was another party— of a stronger, richer, more influential, more technologically advanced and a more confident China. The 2022 Hangzhou Asian Games, delayed by a year due to the devastating COVID pandemic and finally held between September 23 and October 8, 2023, were a significant moment in contemporary Chinese history. It was not just the biggest international event held since the conclusion of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the upliftment of the Zero COVID policy, but it has also been described as presenting a “narrative” that has “shown the world the strength and vigour of Hangzhou as well as the bright prospects for Chinese-style modernisation”[ii]. 

 The most conspicuous feature of the event was its amalgamation of elements of traditional Chinese culture and modernisation. In fact, a whole page on the website of the Games has been dedicated to “Culture”. Every aspect of the event—from the opening date to the emblem, and from the mascots to the architecture—depicted this trend and has been hailed as the “dialogue of diverse Asian civilisations”; embodying the “Asian grace," an “essence of Chinese taste” as well as the “continuity of cultural genes” by the official media.

 The Games commenced on September 23, corresponding to the Autumn Equinox of the Chinese Lunar calendar symbolising good harvest and good fortune. The emblem of the Games called “Tide” (depicted in Image 1) similarly symbolises the wave of Qiantang River and is said to represent the “bravery and tenacity” of the athletes. It has also been related to the verse of an ancient poem by Yang Wanli of the Song Dynasty (c.960-1279 CE), “Braving against the tide bearing the red flag with head held high, without getting drenched” (nongchao’er xiang tao tou li, shouba hongqi qibuzhi 弄潮儿向涛头立，手把红旗旗不湿).

The flame for the torch was lit at the ruins of Liangzhu Ancient City, a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 2019, which represents the Late Neolithic culture in China dating back to c. 3,300–2,300 BCE. The site has been described by Xi as a “testimony of the continuity of Chinese civilisation for at least 5000 years,” which is an “invaluable treasure that cannot be replaced”[iii]. Both the concave mirror, which used sun rays to light the flame, and the cauldron were designed as jade bi (a circular ancient artefact) and jade cong (a tube-like ancient artefact), respectively, from the Liangzhu culture[iv]. The official posters of the games, as presented in Images 2 and 3, reflect the creative use of ancient ink painting designs.

The torch too was unique. Named Xinhuo (薪火) or “eternal flame”, the torch’s design is inspired by the Liangzhu culture with a shape that grows from bottom to top and consists of eight water vein icons to symbolise both the evolution of the civilisation and the eight rivers of Zhejiang. The design consists of a square-round integration indicating harmony (the medals called Shan Shui also reflect this pattern) and the burner nozzle is modelled on the earliest oracle bone inscription of Jade cong implying “light travelling in cycle inside”[v]. The colour scheme of the Games— with “Glowing Red”, “Laurus Yellow”, “Lake and Mountain Green”, “Rainbow Purple”,“Glimmering Blue” and “Mist White”— similarly represent the Chinese cultural concept of harmony and are inspired by Song dynasty poet Su Shi’s verse, “If the West Lake was the Great Beauty, she would look beautiful whether in light or heavy make-up” . In fact. The West Lake and the Jingci temple appear in several images associated with the Games such as Image 4.

 The term Xinhuo comes from the Chinese saying, “The flame of a burning piece of firewood passes on to the rest” (Xianhuo xiangchuan 薪火相传) which represents continuity in terms of knowledge passed from one generation to another. The torch thus symbolises the continuity of the Chinese civilisation over 5000 years of history.

The mascots of the event, Chenchen, Congcong, and Lianlian, are robots that represent the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal, the Archaeological ruins of Liangzhu and the West Lake respectively. The official music video of the Hangzhou Asian Games titled “The Love We Share” (Tong’ai tong zai 同爱同在) sung by popular singer Sun Nan similarly portrayed both the modern architectural marvels as well as richness of traditional Chinese culture and Asian unity[vi].

 As Image 1 notes, the event represented a “New Asian Games” in several respects. Most importantly, it was the first “green”[vii] Asian Games which used a carbon-neutral methanol to light the cauldron at the opening ceremony and solely depended on renewable energy to supply power to all venues[viii]. It was also the first time in Asian Games’ history that spectators could digitally light the flame as it happened in real time at Liangzhu. The torch too was made from recycled materials and used technologies such as blockchain and traceability mechanism to function. Both the opening and the closing ceremonies were highly “futuristic” with use of advanced technologies such as 3D Animation, AR technology, etc. that conveyed China’s technological advancement to the world[ix].

 But if international sports events are opportunities for the host country to give a glimpse of its “essence”,  showcase its “dreams and future hopes” and convey the “vista of its nationhood”[x], What did China try to convey through the 19th Hangzhou Asian Games? Did it use its first biggest international event since important developments in its contemporary history (the outbreak of COVID-19, the centennial of the CPC, the 20th Party Congress and the 14th National People’s Congress which saw Xi Jinping attain the position of the General Secretary of the CPC and the President of the nation for an unprecedented third time) to merely showcase its technological prowess and rich cultural heritage? Why is traditional Chinese culture, considered a ‘feudal remnant’ in the yesteryears, being so proudly promoted? The answers to these questions lie in the turns that the politics of culture have taken in recent years.

 Marx meets Confucius

 At the core of this politics of culture is the renewed significance that Chinese-style modernisation has gained since the 18th Party Congress in 2012 when Xi Jinping assumed the position of the General Secretary for the first time. First put forth by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, Chinese-style modernisation emphasises on the historical and socio economic peculiarities of China that destines it to walk its own “unique” path to modernity, which is different from both the liberal nations of the West and other Socialist nations. This concept, which bestowed “Socialism” with the widely used suffix “Chinese Characteristics”, justified CPC-led China’s turn to a “State-controlled market economy” following the Reform and Opening Up while consistently glossing over any possibilities for political liberalisation. Xi Jinping has further elaborated this concept at the 20th Party Congress by defining it in terms of the “Five Characteristics” (wu ge tezheng 五个特征) which include, modernisation of a huge population that China inhabits, common prosperity for all, material and cultural-ethnic advancement, harmony between humanity and nature and peaceful development. He has also put forth “Nine Basic Requirements” (jiu ge benzhi yaoqiu 九个本质要求) i.e. “upholding the leadership of the Communist Party and Socialism with Chinese characteristics, pursuing high-quality development, developing whole-process people’s democracy, enriching the people’s cultural lives, achieving common prosperity for all, promoting harmony between humanity and nature, building a human community with a shared future, and creating a new form of human advancement”. Moreover, emphasising how the Western model of development has not only failed to provide solutions to human predicament but has further worsened the problem, the CPC presents Chinese-style modernisation as a “lesson” that is “worth emulating” particularly for developing and underdeveloped nations[xi].

 As can be seen, cultural advancement forms an important part of  Chinese-style modernisation  and is crucial for building China into what Xi calls a “modern civilisation”[xii] i.e. a civilisation which is not only highly modern but also cognisant of its rich inheritance of civilisational knowledge (referred to as “Chinese wisdom”) and is led by a people who have “high confidence” and great pride in their culture. “Cultural Self Confidence” is one of the “Four Self Confidences” (namely, confidence in the path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, confidence in the theory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, confidence in the system of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Cultural confidence) which is promoted as part of the Xi Jinping Thought[xiii] adopted at the 19th Party Congress in 2019. Of all, Xi sees Cultural Self Confidence as the “most fundamental, deepest and long-lasting force”[xiv].

 owever, Xi is not the only one who holds this thought. China’s cultural advancement equally concerned Mao Zedong, who noted as early as September 1949, that a Communist victory would pull China out of its “uncivilised” state[xv]. With over three decades of Reform and Opening Up, it was realised that enhanced incomes following economic liberalisation, inroads of Western liberal thought due to greater contacts with the global economy, coupled with the impact of decades of “One Child Policy” had created a certain social crisis with increased individualism among the populace and decreased belief in Socialism. This idea gave rise to the introduction of “Core Socialist Values” (shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan 社会主义核心价值观) at the 17th Party Congress in 2007, which has been emphasised and implemented ever since. The Core Socialist Values, which include patriotism, filial piety, etc., are a set of 12 behavioural traits that reflect a blend of Confucianism, Socialism and Universal ethos.

 Dampening belief in Socialism has led to what the CPC terms as “historical nihilism” (lishi xuwuzhuyi 历史虚无主义) i.e. pessimism or disbelief in the official history of China as espoused by the CPC, disrespect for the leaders of the Chinese Revolution and lack of confidence in both Socialism and the rule of the CPC. Historical Nihilism is understood as being tantamount to questioning the regime legitimacy of the Party and Xi has recurrently targeted it by defining raising confidence in the Party and nation as the solution.

 What sets Xi apart from the previous generations of CPC leadership is the changed international and domestic socioeconomic context which was dubbed the “New Era” (xin shidai 新时代) at the 19th Party Congress. The New Era is defined as a “new historical point for China’s development” where “unbalanced, unsustainable and uncoordinated development” has emerged as the primary contradiction, causing this epochal shift. The New Era is hence understood as both a period of unprecedented challenges and opportunities— it has seen the rise of a stronger and more capable China, with the attainment of the “moderately prosperous society” status and the eradication of abject poverty on the one hand; and on the other, has augmented challenges that emanate both from within China and outside, posed by “hostile” foreign forces that “seek to destabilise” China’s Socialist system as competition between China and the developed nations of the West intensifies producing a new international situation[xvi]. According to the CPC, the New Era has further cemented the maxim that “only socialism can save China”[xvii], thus ending all debates about “which banner to rally behind” that appeared prior to the 18th Party Congress[xviii]. In order to convert unprecedented challenges into opportunities, Xi has tasked himself with the challenge of ‘restoring’ “red genes” among China’s 1.4 billion people that had dissipated under the “weak, hollow, and watered-down Party leadership of the Reform era”[xix] .

However, the fact that Socialism has lost its attractiveness among the populace cannot be denied. Therefore, the “Two Combinations” (liang ge jiehe 两个结合) have been put forth. As the name suggests, the Two Combinations is composed of two important tasks for the CPC: First, combining Marxism with China’s “concrete realities” and Second, combining Marxism with China’s “excellent traditional culture”. The two are understood to exist in a dialectical relationship i.e. they are logically and theoretically interdependent, with their interaction guiding their development. It is argued that the first combination forms the premise for the second combination to exist and develop[xx]. The CPC hence sees Marxism not as a “dogma” but as a “method” which needs to be “rooted” both in China’s specific socioeconomic and historical realities as well as its civilisational historical tradition in order to remain attractive and relevant among the populace. Hence, in Xi’s words, the “soul” of Marxism and the “roots” of Chinese culture need to be firmly remembered[xxi]. As a result, not only are similarities between Marxism and Confucianism such as the focus on “harmony” being highlighted, but the amalgamation of the two, considered nothing short of a heresy in the days of Mao, is now being actively promoted. These developments have not only given rise to a “new nationalism” in China which is rooted in narratives of China’s past and future greatness[xxii] but, have also been manifested internationally as the Global Civilisation Initiative (quanqiu wenhua changyi 全球文化倡议).

 Global Civilisation Initiative

The Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI) has been promoted as a “public good” in line with the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative put forth in 2021 and 2022 respectively. Introduced by Xi at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting held in March 2023, GCI calls for “respecting the diversity” of nations while emphasising on the “common values” such as peace, harmony, etc. that they share. Additionally, GCI notes that it is the uniqueness or differences between civilisations that induces “vitality and momentum” in development. It hence notes that nations should refrain from “stoking ideological confrontation” and “imposing” their values and models on other nations[xxiii]. This idea closely aligns with Xi’s “New Asian Security Concept”, put forth in August 2014, where he indirectly criticised American presence in the region by noting, “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia”[xxiv]. China views American security presence in the region as a threat to its sovereignty and national interests, which has aggravated since the Trump administration labelled Beijing as a “strategic rival”[xxv].

At the core of the GCI lies the perception that the West, particularly the United States, wants to “destabilise” China’s Socialist system and “block its development.” While such arguments have existed for long and have got strengthened since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991[xxvi], they were clearly espoused by the leadership for the first time in several decades when Xi explicitly accused the United States for “curbing (China’s rise), encircling and pressurising” Beijing[xxvii]. However, China’s GCI has failed to convince many as analysts read it as an “intrusive agenda[xxviii]” and an attempt to establish the “primacy” of Chinese civilisation vis a vis other civilisations like India[xxix]. Moreover, many note that Xi’s centrality to the cultural thought as the “core” of the Party resounds of “political hegemonism” of the CPC[xxx] and hence note that it would prove to be detrimental to China’s goals of enhancing its soft power.

Concluding RemarksWhile suspicions remain, some points are worth considering. First, barring some nations, China’s “cultural offensive” against the United States has few takers[xxxi] and Beijing is not unaware of this fact[xxxii]. Moreover, many analysts among the Chinese Left worry about the “pro-American” stance that many within China share[xxxiii]. Second, even if one considers China’s ambitions to “remake the world”[xxxiv], it lacks not just soft but also the hard power to do so as seen in several arenas in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to lag behind[xxxv]. Third, the “enormous crisis” that China finds itself faced with cannot be denied. Despite listing numerous threats that could spring up as “black swans” and “grey rhinos” anytime, Xi did not present a single solution[xxxvi]. Fourth, the contradictions identified in the New Era show no signs of abatement[xxxvii] and prospects for economic growth look grim for the near future surface[xxxviii]. Given these conditions, it is hard to believe that China is considering any serious “cultural confrontation” with the West for some time to come. Even if it does, it is highly unlikely that such attempts are even slightly realisable. Fifth and most importantly, the threats enlisted in this paper that the CPC perceives to its regime legitimacy are hard to overlook. As the competition between Beijing and Washington intensifies and belief in various China Threat Theories sharpens, the Communist Party has come to view fascination with Western culture and liberal values as proselytising factors that endanger its mandate to rule, specifically as building a ‘united multiethnic nation’ continues to mount with challenges. The politics of culture in Xi’s China hence seems to be more concerned with the domestic challenges than any cultural showdown and can be understood as buttressing the logic of China’s peculiarity that has preserved the concept of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for several decades. As for the 19th Hangzhou Asian Games, it can be understood as a game of semiotics—- that did not just display China’s newfound confidence and cultural identity in the “New Era” and express its discourse power or what the Chinese call, “the right to speak” (huayuquan 话语权) but also stands as the CPC’s attempt to unify and mobilise 1.4 billion Chinese from different walks of life, and in the process, raise their confidence, both in the nation and the Party.

 Endnotes

[i] Schuman, Michael. "These Beijing Olympics Send a Much Darker Message", The Atlantic, February 2, 2022. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/the-dour-message-of-chinas-second-olympics/621454/  Last accessed on February 18, 2024

[ii] Li Zhongwen (李中文) et al.2023."Chengzai meihao xiangwang xieshou gong fu weilai---xie zai Hangzhoy yahui yuanman luoxia weimu zhiji" (承载美好向往 携手共赴未来——写在杭州亚运会圆满落下帷幕之际) [Carrying beautiful yearnings and heading into the future hand in hand - written on the occasion of the successful conclusion of the Hangzhou Asian Games], Beijing Daily, October 9, https://bj.bjd.com.cn/5b165687a010550e5ddc0e6a/contentShare/5b16573ae4b02a9fe2d558f9/AP65233079e4b053a74da957e2.html  Last accessed on February 18, 2024

 [iii] Xinhua. 2023. “Xi Focus-Closeup: The Liangzhu site and its significance to Chinese civilization”, China Daily, December 5, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202312/05/WS656ed950a31090682a5f18f1.html#:~:text=After%20watching%20a%20documentary%20on,that%20it%20must%20be%20well Last accessed on February 18, 2024

[iv] Xinhua. 2023. “Flame for Hangzhou 2022 Asian Games lit in Liangzhu culture site”, June 15, https://english.news.cn/20230615/0da8707170414a96b5aca2ca345a33cf/c.html Last accessed on February 18, 2024

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[vi] 19th Asian Games Hangzhou. 2023. ““The Love We Share,” the official theme song of the Hangzhou Asian Games”, Youtube, August 24,  https://youtu.be/zxG8_-zspg0?feature=shared Last accessed on February 18, 2024

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[ix]The Economic Times. 2023. “Hangzhou Asian Games opens with futuristic ceremony”, September 25, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/sports/hangzhou-asian-games-opens-with-futuristic-ceremony/articleshow/103892544.cms?from=mdr Last accessed on February 18, 2024

[x] Daniel Lemus-Delgado (2021) International sports events and national identity: the opening ceremony of the Taipei Universiade, Sport in Society, 24:7, 1093-1109, DOI: 10.1080/17430437.2020.1732929

[xi] Hitkari, Cherry. 2023. “Modernisation, Chinese-style”, Modern Diplomacy. March 10, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/03/10/modernisation-chinese-style/  Last accessed on February 18, 2024

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[xxii] Thakur, Ravni. 2023. China in the 21st Century: Key Issues and Challenges. New Delhi: Kalpaz.

[xxiii] Xinhua. 2023. “Global Civilization Initiative injects fresh energy into human development”, State Council of the People’s Republic of China, March 19, http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2023-03/19/content_85177312.htm Last accessed on February 18, 2024

[xxiv] Takagaki, Seiichiro. 2014. “Xi Jinping's New Asian Security Concept”, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, August 27,  https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/ajiss_commentary/column-224.html Last accessed on February 18, 2024

[xxv] Feng, Liu.2020. “The recalibration of Chinese assertiveness: China’s responses to the Indo-Pacific challenge”. International Affairs 96:1

[xxvi]Song Qiang (宋强) et al. 1996. Zhongguo keyi shuo bu: lengzhanhou shidai de zhengzhi yu qinggan jueze (中国可以说不:冷战后时代的政治与情感抉择)[China Can Say No: Political and Emotional Choices in the Post-Cold War Era], Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chuban she. Also see, Song Qiang (宋强)  et al. 2009. Zhongguo bu gaoxing: Da shidai, Da mubiao ji Women de neiyouwaihuan (中国不高兴：大时代，大目标及我们的内忧外患)[Unhappy China: The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challeges],Jiangsu: Jiangsu renmin chuban she.

[xxvii] Xi Jinping. 2023. “Xi Jinping zai kanwang canjia zhengxie huiyi de min jian gongshang lian jie weiyuan shi qiangdiao zhengque yindao minying jingji jiankang fazhan gao zhiliang fazhan wanghuning caiqi ding xue xiang canjia kanwang he taolun ”( 习近平在看望参加政协会议的民建工商联界委员时强调 正确引导民营经济健康发展高质量发展 王沪宁蔡奇丁薛祥参加看望和讨论) [“When Xi Jinping visited the members of the Joint Committee of Civil Construction, Industry and Commerce who attended the CPPCC meeting, he emphasized that the private economy should be correctly guided to develop healthily and with high quality. Wang Huning, Cai Qiding, Xue Xiang, attended the visit and discussion”], Xinhua, March 6, 2023 http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-03/06/c_1129417096.htm Last accessed on February 18, 2024

[xxviii]Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. 2023. “China’s new global initiatives mask an intrusive agenda”, The Economic Times , October 12, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/chinas-new-global-initiatives-mask-an-intrusive-agenda/articleshow/104360749.cms?from=mdr Last accessed on February 18, 2024

[xxix] Jacob, Jabin T. 2024. “Threats in Xi Jinping’s ‘civilisational’ claims”, The Deccan Herald, January 15,  https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/threats-in-xi-jinpings-civilisational-claims-2849218 Last accessed on February 18, 2024

[xxx]Hope, Arran. “Thinking About Xi Jinping Thought on Culture”, China Brief, Volume 23, Issue 19, https://jamestown.org/program/thinking-about-xi-jinping-thought-on-culture/ Last accessed on February 18, 2024

[xxxi] Cai, Jane. 2023. “China mounts cultural offensive to win ‘war of narratives’ against US. Will other countries be swayed?”, South China Morning Post. July 5, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3226039/china-mounts-cultural-offensive-win-war-narratives-against-us-will-other-countries-be-swayed Last accessed on february 18, 2024

[xxxii] Hitkari 2023

[xxxiii] Adlakha, Hemant. 2023. “What is China debating? To cooperate with Washington or to prepare for the struggle against US imperialism?”, Modern Diplomacy, December 21, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/12/21/what-is-china-debating-to-cooperate-with-washington-or-to-prepare-for-the-struggle-against-us-imperialism/ Last accessed on February 18, 2024.

[xxxiv] Schuman, Michael et al. 2023. “How Beijing’s newest global initiatives seek to remake the world order”, Atlantic Council, June 21, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-beijings-newest-global-initiatives-seek-to-remake-the-world-order/ Last accessed on february 18, 2024

[xxxv] Roza, David. 2023. “The US Thinks China Is a ‘Near-Peer’ Threat. Does China Agree?”, Air & Space Forces Magazine, March 22, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/china-near-peer-us-pla-military/ Last accessed on February 18, 2024

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